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UNCOVERING, DISCLOSING, AND DISCOVERING
HOW THE PUBLIC DIMENSIONS OF
COURT-BASED PROCESSES ARE AT RISK
JUDITH RESNIK*
In this essay-considering "privacy" and "secrecy " in courts-Ifirst of-
fer a brief history of the public performance, through adjudication, of the
power of rulers, who relied on open rituals ofjudgment and punishment
to make and maintain law and order. Second, I turn to consider why,
during the twentieth century, the federal courts became an unusually
good source of information about legal, political, and social conflict.
Third, I map how, despite new information technologies, knowledge
about conflicts and their resolution is being limited by the devolution of
court authority to agencies, by the outsourcing of decisions to private
providers, and by the internalization in courts of rules that promote pri-
vate management and settlement of conflicts in lieu of adjudication.
Fourth, I argue that deployment of new procedures of dispute resolution
requires new answers to questions about what processes should be pre-
sumptively public and that, given their political implications, these an-
swers should not be left to judges, as rulemakers or doctrine-producers
alone. Fifth, I explain why new regulations are needed to protect the
public dimensions of courts and to create public dimensions for their al-
ternatives. Public processes generate not only knowledge about the uses
of power but also a commitment to fair treatment by government, to ac-
countability in government, and to norm development, all of which
should not be controlled exclusively by the parties to a dispute nor by
those empowered to resolve it.
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I. SECRECY AND SUNSHINE IN CONTEXT
How much information related to litigation and relevant to court-based
decisionnaking is, and should be, available to the public? What materials are
appropriately private and what information is wrongly hidden from public
purview? Should these questions be couched in the language of privacy, a
value much respected though complex to parse, ' or as part of a troubling trend
towards secrecy in courts? 2 What kind of discussions would emerge, were the
problem framed as one of enhancing access through the information highway
of the Internet and television so as to improve the dissemination of knowledge
produced through and about the courts? 3
Such questions, coupled with concerns about actual practices4 and pro-
posed federal legislation mandating "sunshine in litigation," 5 prompted re-
1. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004). This issue was recently addressed
in a conference, entitled "Classified: Secret Evidence and the Courts in the Age of National Security,"
that was held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, in December of 2005. Its brochure described
its goal as considering the "transformation... occurring in Article III courts, immigration proceedings,
military courts and status review tribunals: the expanded use of secret evidence." (Brochure of Confer-
ence, held Dec. 5 and 6, 2005 on file with the Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Stuart Shapiro, & Steven J. Balla, Unifying Rulemaking Informa-
tion: Recommendations for the New Federal Docket Management System, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 621
(2005) (describing efforts to make information on federal regulation more readily available through the
internet and the response by a group of more than fifty scholars concerned about information storage as
well as methods for searching and downloading the data).
4. See, e.g., SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS,
CONFIDENTIALITY & PuB. ACCESS, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO CIVIL CASES (Ronald J. Hedges &
Kenneth J. Withers eds., rev. Apr. 2005 Public Comment Drft.), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscfiles/publicationshtml (seeking to describe the
contemporary contexts and prescribe best practices).
5. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2005, S. 1348, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill would require
that courts not enter orders under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "restricting the disclosure of
information obtained through discovery, an order approving a settlement agreement that would restrict
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searchers at the Federal Judicial Center to inquire into the practice of sealing
court-based settlements. 6 From their review of a sample of docket sheets from
different federal districts, researchers reported in 2004 that few litigants in
their data set requested that settlements filed in court be sealed.7 One might
infer from the relative rarity of docket sheets noting sealing that information
about how cases are processed and about their outcomes is generally accessi-
ble. An alternative explanation, detailed in this essay, is that privatization of
court-based decisionmaking is underway but that sealing court files is not the
predominant mode used to accomplish what some describe as appropriate
measures of "confidentiality" and "privacy" and what others decry as inap-
propriate "secrecy."
Sealing settlements is one of many vehicles to limit access to knowledge
about disputes. Below, I explore the multiple means of privatizing conflict
resolution. Further, I explain why the hard questions about who should have
access (and how) to what kinds of information related to which forms of con-
flict resolution ought not be analyzed by considering only court-based rules,
doctrine, and data. I argue that privatizing court processes does put at risk the
public dimensions of adjudication and that, given the variety of normative
the disclosure of such information, or an order restricting access to court records in a civil case" without
finding that such orders would not "restrict" disclosure of information "relevant to the protection of
public health or safety," or that the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by "a specific and sub-
stantial interest" in maintaining confidentiality, and further that the protective order is "no broader than
necessary to protect the privacy interest." Id. (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1660(a)). The bill also provides that
any orders entered during the pendency of a litigation not continue in effect after the entry of a final
judgment without a court making separate findings in which the proponents of restricting access have
the burden of proof. Further, the bill would prohibit parties from seeking others to stipulate to nondis-
closure as a condition of discovery. This proposal follows earlier ones, as comparable bills have been
introduced since the 1990s. See, e.g., S. 817, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 957, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 374,
104th Cong. (1995); and S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1993). For discussion of the Sunshine in the Courtroom
Act of 2005, addressing televised courtroom proceedings, see infra note 44.
6. See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, MARIE LEARY, NATACHA BLAIN,
STEVEN S. GENSLER, GEORGE CORT, & DEAN MILETICH, SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2004) [hereinafter FJC SEALED SETTLEMENT STUDY].
7. From a sample of fifty-two of the ninety-four federal district courts, the researchers culled
more than 280,000 docket filings and found court-sealed settlement agreements in a small number-
1,270 cases, or one out of every 227 cases, constituting under one-half of one percent of the filings
reviewed. Id. at 3; see also id. at app. c (providing summaries of the cases). Sealing occurred in a range
of kinds of cases (including personal injury, employment, civil rights, and contract cases) with higher
rates of confidentiality in certain kinds of cases, such as those filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Id. at 3 (noting that Fair Labor Standards Act cases had a rate of sealing almost six times the overall
average). The researchers concluded that in at least two-fifths of the cases identified, sealing occurred
when cases had features making them of "special public interest." Id. at 7. That such cases are ones in
which sealing occurs can also be seen from a non-random consideration of published caselaw. In 2003,
for example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a blanket protective order making secret a good deal of discov-
ery related to alleged fraud by an insurance company. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331
F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). The court held that a "presumption of access" attached to discovery materials
submitted in conjunction with dispositive motions and remanded the case to the trial court to revisit its
ban on access. Id. at 1136. See also Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2003)
(approving a settlement in a Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuit but ordering that it be unsealed).
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commitments embodied in the practice of open courts, the resulting losses are
significant.
This essay is part of a larger project, aimed at understanding the relation-
ship between adjudication (a practice that long predates the development of
liberal constitutional democracies) and democratic commitments to widen the
circle of claimants eligible to enforce rights against each other and against the
state.8 My argument here proceeds in five steps. First, I offer a brief history of
the public performance, through adjudication, of the power of rulers who
relied on open rituals about judgment and punishment to make and to main-
tain law and order.
By reviewing the traditions of adjudication in the Renaissance and there-
after, I show how adjudicatory practices influenced political theory about
good government. Through adjudication and other activities, a range of norms
for state behavior developed. For example, when displaying the power of the
state to impose judgment, courts gathered, used, and disseminated informa-
tion. Judgments were supposed to be linked to and constrained by evidence.
Moreover, to establish legitimacy, rulers (both oligarchical and aristocratic)
instructed judges not to favor disputants because of personal relationships.
Over time and in part through the practice of public display, concepts about
accountability and transparency in government decisionmaking, fair treatment
between disputants, and respect for ordinary persons moved from the realm of
the customary into that of right.
Second, I turn from this multi-century overview to the United States, and
provide an account of aspects of the political economy of the American jus-
tice system that made the federal courts an unusually good source of informa-
tion about legal, political, and social conflicts. Given the centrality, recent
changes in federal practices are of particular saliency. Third, I map how, de-
spite the information explosion enabled by new technologies, knowledge
about conflicts and their resolutions is being limited. While courts were once
information producers and information outlets, that function is diminishing
through (a) the devolution of court authority to agencies, (b) the outsourcing
of decisions to private dispute resolution providers, and (c) the internalization
by courts of rules and practices that promote conflict management and settle-
ment (alternative dispute resolution or ADR) in lieu of adjudication.
These changes represent a movement away from a litigation model ex-
emplified by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (with their due proc-
ess predicates) to what should be called "Contract Procedure," in which
8. See Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to
Twenty-First Century Courthouses, Henry La Barre Jayne Lecture at the American Philosophical
Society (Nov. 12, 2005) (on file with the author).
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judges strive to produce settlements. 9 This privatization makes it more diffi-
cult to grasp the nature, content, and consequences of conflicts in which pub-
lic norms are invoked.
Both the Due Process Model of the 1930s and the Contract Procedure
Model of the twenty-first century rely on crafting new forms of process-
ranging from discovery to pretrial meetings of lawyers and judges to judicial
settlement conferences and other forms of alternative dispute resolution.
Questions thus emerge about whether these new forms of process ought to
include public dimensions. For some, responding entails determining whether
the pretrial phase of litigation, with discovery and settlement as its focus, is to
be analogized to trials and thus ought to inherit their presumption of openness.
For others, the claim is that pre-trial activities are more akin to what once took
place in lawyers' offices and, hence, ought presumptively to be private. For
me, the quest for analogies is limited by a recognition that many of the twen-
tieth century's innovations are, in fact, new-requiring distinct answers that
are informed by historic, doctrinal, or political principles but which cannot be
decided by reasoning from prior premises alone.
Thus, and fourth, I urge recognition that the deployment of new proce-
dures requires new answers to questions about what aspects of these processes
should be presumptively public. Moreover, I argue that questions about the
public dimensions of adjudication cannot be focused on courts alone. For
hundreds of thousands of claimants, administrative agencies are, functionally,
courts. And in light of the turn to other "alternatives," those processes must
also be under scrutiny.
Fifth, such resolution ought not to rest solely with judges, either as rule-
makers or as producers of doctrine. Nor should that power be given to liti-
gants left unfettered to negotiate any terms that they please. Rather, the issues
of whether to enable or inhibit the closing down of public access to, and par-
ticipation in, adjudication as well as its alternatives require analyses of the
claimed utilities of public and of private resolutions and of theories of political
power and legal rights. Both popular and legislative input is needed to con-
sider how, in the context of changing technologies, conflicts and the paths
toward their resolution can be brought to and remain in the public sphere.1 0
To assist that discussion, I detail some of the interventions possible. New
regulations are needed not only to respond to changing technologies but also
to rules and practices that have already reduced the information filed in court.
9. I describe the changes in greater depth in Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 593 (2005).
10. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004); Nancy L.
Rosenblum, Political Parties as Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 813 (2000); Nancy L.
Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 493 (2000).
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The familiarity of courts' public dimensions may lead some to assume
the stability of those attributes. I do not. My concern about the need to protect
the public dimensions of adjudication and to create ways to vest public as-
pects into court-alternatives does not stem from an assumption that courts are
either the best or the only resource for understanding the nature of injuries, the
kinds of conflicts around us, the development of legal norms, and the roles
and obligations of governments. But courts, well practiced in contributing to
social ordering through public enactment of the state's power, are one source
worth preserving.
II. THE PUBLIC DISPLAY OF STATE POWER
Adjudication, a useful practice for ruling powers of various sorts, pre-
dates the rise of democratic political regimes. To maintain order and to en-
force obligations, legal regimes do "violence,"' 1 in that both civil and
criminal judgments involve the relocation of rights to property or to personal
liberty. Public displays of such violence-including the pageantry that once
surrounded executions (as Michel Foucault famously analyzedl2) - -
demonstrate and thereby help to make and to legitimate the state's force.
Punishments have since moved largely offstage-from the scaffold and
stocks of town squares to the prisons. Yet the public processes of trials, hark-
ening back to Greek traditions and before, 13 have continued until recently to
be predicates to criminal punishment and to civil adjudication. 14 The activities
of judges-under monarchies and in pre-democratic republics as well as in
democracies-have influenced contemporary ideas about how governments
ought to behave, both in dispute resolution and more generally. While a good
deal of contemporary writing focuses on the role of courts in producing legal
rules of various kinds and disseminating information, the contributions of
adjudication's open practices are more far-ranging.
Hundreds of years ago, in and through adjudication, premises developed
that ruling powers ought to provide even-handed and, in some respects, equal
treatment to (certain) subjects when judges decided disputes. Evidence of
11. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
12. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan,
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975). See also SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON, JR., PICTURES AND
PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE (1985).
13. See Adriaan M. Lanni, Note, Spectator Sport or Serious Politics? oi periesthkotes and the
Athenian Lawcourts, 117 J. HELLENIC STUD. 183 (1997); Kathryn Slanski, Mesopotamia: Middle
Babylonian Period, in I A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW 485, 491-96 (Raymond West-
brook ed., 2003).
14. See VI JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355-70 (Edinburgh, William
Tait 1843) (1827) (reprinting I JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE); see also Fred
Cutler, Jeremy Bentham and the Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321 (1999).
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such ideas come from Renaissance Town Halls in which, in rooms dedicated
to resolving cases, one can find the Latin phrase, Audi & Alteram partem-
"Hear the other side as well."' 5 Over time, the idea took hold that the power
of judgment could not be exercised in an utterly arbitrary fashion but instead
required some justification, with outcomes reflective of the relevant facts and
the governing customs and rules. In some eras and in some jurisdictions, the
need for information was used to justify torture, imposed in centuries past as a
predicate to punishment rather than as a punishment. 16 In later eras, rules of
evidence and procedure served not only to impose the power of the state but
also to alter the distribution of power between litigants.
The obligations of judges also changed, as the concept developed that
judgments should not be influenced or corrupted by judges' personal ties to or
receipt of money from disputants. Allegorical scenes in Town Halls showed
judges who demonstrated their loyalty to the state by ordering that their own
children be harmed when found to have violated the laws of the state. 17 Fur-
ther, while parties once gave "gifts" to judges, rulers came to prohibit that
practice by recasting such gifts as illicit "bribes."' 18 Instruction against receipt
of money from litigants can be found in many rooms in which judgments
were made. For example, in the Town Hall of Geneva, a 1604 fresco called
Les Juges Aux Mains Coup~es showed a panel of judges, all with cut-off
hands. At one side is a phrase from the Old Testament that warned that the
taking of gifts "blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the right-
eous."' 19 In Bruges, its City Hall showed the flaying of a judge who had ac-
cepted a bag of money.20 With such prohibitions, judges became more
dependent upon kings, who funded their positions when parties no longer
15. The Town Hall of Amsterdam provides one such example. See KATHARINE FREMANTLE, THE
BAROQUE TOWN HALL OF AMSTERDAM 76 (1959) (describing the phrase in gold lettering above the
entrance to the Magistrates' Court, a room in the Town Hall).
16. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF (1977).
17. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 8 (discussing the scenes in the tribunal of the Amsterdam Town
Hall in which Brutus is shown ordering the death of his son for joining a conspiracy against Rome and
in which Zaleucus is portrayed as gouging his own eye and that of his son, who had violated the edict
against adultery).
18. See NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, THE GIFT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 86-90 (2000).
19. Id. at 85 (providing a translation of the words, taken from Exodus 23:8). A reproduction of
that image can be found in Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727,
1736 fig.4 (1987) [hereinafter, Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice]. The fresco, from 1604 and by Cesar
Giglio, was commissioned for the chambers; subsequent refurbishing covered the wall, and the image
was not found again until 1901. See BARBARA ROTH-LOCHNER & LIVIO FORNARA, THE TOWN HALL
OF GENEVA 10 (Jean Gunn trans., 1986).
20. See Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, supra note 19, at 1737 fig.5a, 1738 fig.5b, 1749-50.
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contributed to judicial livelihoods. 21 But the ban has come to mean that, for
decisions to be perceived to be fair, judges must not be beholden to parties.
Public performance (aimed to enable catharsis, information develop-
ment, or explanatory didacticism) is another longstanding attribute of adjudi-
cation.22 For example, visitors to Amsterdam's seventeenth century Town
Hall (now called the Royal Palace, due to its use by Napoleon Bonaparte)
may enter the Tribunal where judgments were pronounced and sentences,
including death, were imposed. That marble chamber is on the ground floor,
with windows through which those on the street could see the proceedings. 23
Public punishments had elaborate rituals that marked the import of that
event.24 Such displays were the means by which rulers showed their power,
insisted on their capacity to command obedience, and gave content to the
practices with which they sought compliance. 25
Through such public presentation of evidence, information about con-
flicts became available to a wider audience. And once disseminated, the state
could not always contain the effects of its own processes. The consequences
of a lack of containment ranged from uncontrollable crowds (as Foucault
recounted 26) to the generation of new information (as Jeremy Bentham argued
when noting that public processes gave witnesses reputational stakes and, at
times, prompted new witnesses to come forward27). More recently, as injuries
can be experienced across a wide spectrum of persons, publicity about con-
flict enables individuals, situated similarly to those already-identified as "vic-
tims," to perceive themselves as sharing problems that are redressable through
law. In a world of mass torts, consumer fraud, and sexual abuse, open conflict
may serve to expose wrongdoers continuing to place others in harm's way. In
this respect, knowledge about conflicts may be a source of yet more conflict.
21. See DAVIS, supra note 18, at 86-90 (also noting that judges defended the practice on the basis
that both sides gave gifts).
22. See Lanni, supra note 13, at 183 (noting Bentham's reference to the "theatre of justice" and
providing a description of the "social drama" enacted in ancient Greek law courts, in which spectators
"played a crucial role"); Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts
Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975); see generally John H. Langbein, Historical
Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1996).
23. FREMANTLE, supra note 15, at 80.
24. See FOUCAULT, supra note 12; EDGERTON, supra note 12; see also Beth A. Berkowitz, Nego-
tiating Violence and the Word in Rabbinic Law, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 125 (2005) (describing these
rules of the Rabbis of the second century).
25. See generally MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 65-110 (2000).
26. FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 59-65.
27. Bentham argued that publicity served as a check on "mendacity and incorrectness," in that the
wider the circle of dissemination of a witness's testimony, the greater the likelihood of truth and accu-
racy. "Many a known face, and every unknown countenance, presents to him a possible source of
detection." BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 355 (quoting himself in an earlier volume).
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Another early function of adjudication was recordation. For hundreds of
years, in Europe and then the Americas, churches and courts provided loca-
tions for people to gather, to record, and to disseminate information. By some
time during the twelfth century, courts came to be relied upon to verify facts.
As Pollock and Maitland explain, courts were able to create "indisputable
evidence of. . . transaction[s]" in eras when forgeries "were common. '28
Long before public archives and private title companies existed, courts (actu-
ally often rooms within multi-purpose Town Hall buildings) were govern-
ment-based document repositories.
As countries have become more committed to democratic practices, the
openness of courts and their information-forcing capacities continue to serve
as visible demonstrations of rulers' power. Violence remains a critical feature
of adjudication. The imposition of the state's norms results in the dislocation
of persons and property. Yet democracies have also developed a rich under-
standing of the rights of individuals under government. The public dimensions
of court processes have become embedded in a language of entitlements, as
can be found in the constitutional doctrine of the United States, 29 in the texts
of state constitutions, 30 in some transnational agreements, 31 and in rules of
courts.32 In addition to express provisions, public access today rests on tradi-
tion, on opposition to certain forms of secretive state processes, and on claims
28. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 94-95
(Lawyers' Literary Club 1959) (1898) (describing the development in England of the "seisin under a
fine," a "final concord levied by the king's court," which was "in substance a conveyance of land and in
form a compromise of the action"); id. at 540 (discussing the commonplace events of forgery and
perjury). While in some instances a real dispute existed, in many instances the litigation was begun to
enable a compromise to be entered. Further, through fines, parties were bound to perform and had rights
against third parties. Compromising without permission was an offense, and the king made money from
licenses sold to justices. Thus, the system of reliance on courts as notaries had various utilities. Id. at
97-99. See also S.F.C. MILSoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 181-82 (2d ed.
1981).
29. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial .... ).
30. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("All courts shall be open .. "); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9
("All courts shall be public....").
31. See, e.g., Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), at 54, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
("[Elveryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law." The press and the public may be excluded for limited reasons.); Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), opened for signature
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 005 ("Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public
may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security
in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties
so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.").
32. See, e.g., S.C. R. CIv. P. 41.1 (entitled "Sealing Documents and Settlement Agreements" and
including the statement that it was enacted "to set forth with clarity the fact that the courts of this State
are presumed to be open and to set forth with particularity when documents and settlement agreements,
submitted to a court for approval, may be sealed").
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for its utility, both educational and supervisory. 33 And the rights of disputants
and obligations of the state to perform in public have in turn also generated
rights of access for non-parties to watch some of the state's decisionmaking. 34
The openness of court-based processes has also helped to anchor the idea
that governments have to account for their own authority by letting others
know how and why power was used. Over time, governments themselves, as
plaintiffs or defendants, have become subject to the constraints of adjudica-
tory processes and have had to bear the exposure that revelations can entail.
As courts developed practices of explanations, reduced to writing and pub-
lished in opinions, they disseminated their findings, initially through a desig-
nated reporter and, more recently, in a marketplace of providers. 35 These
public dimensions of adjudication are now part of a more general idea, "trans-
parency," which in recent decades has become an important attribute of le-
gitimate state decisionmaking-sometimes implemented by Freedom of
Information Acts or other legislative directives mandating disclosure.
As these examples also suggest, being able to watch the resolution of
conflict and to know about the sanctions that flow also permits policing of the
decisionmakers. Jeremy Bentham captured this idea with his statement that
"[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice.... It keeps the judge himself, while
trying, under trial."'36 Judge and jurors are regularly criticized (some may
argue, too often criticized) because of the decisions that they render. And
again, accountability is both desirable and anxiety producing, as one aspires to
a form of judgment in adjudication that is sensitive to context but not aiming
to please. This accountability also has an egalitarian aspect, for government
and litigant alike are both subject to scrutiny as we give meaning to our legal
rules. Further, under current norms in the United States, courts oblige partici-
33. Bentham described courts as "school[s] of the highest order." BENTHAM, supra note 14, at
355. See generally Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 405-26
(1987) [hereinafter Resnik, A Public Dimension] (analyzing the justifications proffered by courts identi-
fying constitutional rights of access to court proceedings, both civil and criminal).
34. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that "docket sheets enjoy a presumption of openness and that the public and the media
possess a qualified First Amendment right to inspect them" and explaining the utility of such an ap-
proach); see also Public Trial. Exclusion of Spectators, 16 YALE L.J. 341 (1907) (describing Roman
practices of private taking of evidence that came to be associated with subsequent Ecclesiastical courts
in England, the discretion accorded judges to close courts under an English statute of 1848, and the
American commitment to public criminal trials in both federal and state constitutions). The author
concluded that judges had discretion to exclude disruptive persons but not those of "mature years and
whose moral standard" were not "notably deficient" for judges did not have the power to order "a
wholesale exclusion of persons not directly interested." Id. at 344.
35. Bentham proposed that any note-takers should be permitted to disseminate their materials on
what had transpired in courts. See BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 356.
36. BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 355; see also NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE:
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 79-81 (2003) (citing Bentham's precept).
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pants to provide information (through discovery and disclosure) to each other,
and that obligatory exchange puts courts in the business of empowering-
equalizing in some respects the stature of--disputants.
In addition to demonstrating inter-litigant obligations and disclosing
facts, processes, and outcomes, open court-based conflict resolution teaches
(a) that the appropriate solutions and remedies, as well as the underlying
rights, are not necessarily fixed, and (b) that decisions on liability and remedy
do not belong exclusively to the disputants. The public and the immediate
participants see that law varies by contexts, decisionmakers, litigants, and
facts.37 These activities reveal that the legitimate imposition of legal norms
occurs through interactions among disputants, the government, and outsiders
bearing witness to the fact of state-based resolutions.
Openness both imposes and creates connections among those in conflict
and the communities whose norms govern resolution. Thus, through the pub-
lic activities of adjudication and adjudicators' obligations to give fair hearings
to both sides, power is shifted among disputants. Further, through open courts,
governments account for the development of legal rights and remedies. Such
iterations may produce new obligations or reinforce prior legal commitments.
Law application becomes a process constituted through these various sectors
of participants.
To appreciate the political and social utilities of the public dimensions of
adjudication is not to ignore the costs and burdens imposed. 38 The immediate
participants in a dispute may find the exposure to the public disquieting. In
public adjudication, parties may find common ground or deeper discord; they
may reveal truths or make false claims about each other or themselves. More-
over, even the disclosure of accurate information can be uncomfortable. Fur-
ther, while connecting with a community around a dispute may result in
support and in the creation of new rights and remedies, it can also produce
anger, which may prompt vengeful consequences in a particular case and
more generally. As for the spectators, watching state-authorized decisionmak-
ers may prompt celebration or boredom, as well as distress at perceived errors
37. Political theorists focus on this public elaboration through democratic iterations, although not
always on courts as a central stage for such dialogues. See, e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rchg,
trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND
CITIZENS (2004).
38. While providing many explanations of the utility of public processes, Bentham also argued the
costs of public disclosure as he analyzed justifications for privacy (such as protecting participants from
"annoyance," avoiding unnecessary harm to individuals through disclosure of "facts prejudicial to their
honour" or about their "pecuniary circumstances," and preserving "public decency" and state secrets),
and he argued that a presumption in favor of public trials could upon occasion give way. BENTHAM,
supra note 14, at 360-70.
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and missteps made by disputants, witnesses, or decisionmakers. Concerns
about privacy and about too-easy, too-truncated, or too-unbalanced dissemi-
nation of information are grounded in this range of responses and require rules
that take into account both new and old challenges entailed in the public dis-
play of conflict.
In short, adjudication predated democracy and facets of its practices-
public performance, some degree of fair treatment of those within a dispute,
the revelation and the evaluation of information about conflict, and fettered
decisionmaking by government-empowered judges who are not to be influ-
enced by gifts or personal affiliations-became aspects of democratic govern-
ance more generally. And, of course, democracy not only drew from
adjudication but also changed it in many respects-most notably by endowing
women and men of all colors with rights to their own personhood and with
rights against the state. As more persons gained rights against governments
and as polities imposed obligations of accounting and of transparency on
governments, public processes became a method of enforcement of these
rights as well as a means of giving life to those rights. Indeed, the challenge of
provisioning all of those rightsholders has, in turn, become one of the justifi-
cations for the privatization of process.
To identify the continuity of aspects of adjudication over time and their
social import should not, however, deflect the focus from how radically dif-
ferent are the ways in which judges today work. Courts have developed bu-
reaucratic infrastructures, in part to respond to the volume of claimants and in
part from views about the need to revitalize juridical process. As a conse-
quence, what constitutes "openness" and the modes by which court-based
information is gathered and exchanged vary across time and place. Before the
twentieth century, the public gained knowledge via the open doors and win-
dows of courtrooms in which trials and hearings took place, through the epi-
sodic publication and dissemination of opinions, and by personal inspection of
papers filed with courts. With the rise of the newspaper business, the press
provided another route, as did commercial publishers of opinions.
Today's technologies have many times amplified the possibilities. In ad-
dition to the publication of decisions through the web and access to files
through electronic databases, 39 some jurisdictions (both inside the United
States and beyond) facilitate access through broadcasting some court proceed-
ings. For example, proceedings may be televised in the Supreme Court of
39. See Jason Krause, Towering Titans, A.B.A. J., May 2004, at 51 (providing some of the history
of John B. West & Co. and its evolution as well as some discussion of its competition).
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Canada40 and in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Territories
of Yugoslavia. 41 Experiments in televised proceedings have also taken place
in New York42 and California. 43 Although television is not commonly used in
the federal system,44 media access to hearings in court and perhaps more gen-
40. Only Supreme Court proceedings are televised. As to the method, most "courtroom proceed-
ings are televised by the Canadian Parliamentary Affairs Channel (CPAC)." See Supreme Court of
Canada, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/faq/faq/index-e.asp (last visited Feb.
27, 2006). See generally A. Wayne MacKay, Framing the Issues for Cameras in the Courtrooms:
Redefining Judicial Dignity and Decorum, 19 DALHOUSIE L.J. 139 (1996) (exploring whether, under
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights, providing for freedom of the press and of expression,
electronic media ought to have access to court proceedings).
41. All proceedings other than deliberations "shall be held in public, unless otherwise provided."
Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Territories of Yugoslavia [ICTY], Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, at Rule 78 (Open Sessions), ICTY Doc. IT/32/Rev.37 (March 29, 2006),
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/1T032Rev37e.pdf When needed for protection of victims
or witnesses or for reasons of security or justice, the trial chambers may make provisions for private or
in camera processes. Id. at Rule 75 (Measures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses), Rule 79
(Closed Sessions). Full transcripts and, when appropriate, video recordings are made. See id. at Rule 81
(Records of Proceedings and Evidence). The tribunal's working languages are English and French; in
addition, the accused has a right to use his or her own language. Id. at Rule 3 (Languages). Transmis-
sion is provided via a web link, enabling the public, including people in the former territories, to see the
proceedings; the languages offered include French, English, and Serbo-Croatian. See ICTY, Courtroom
Schedule: Online Broadcasting, http://www.un.org/icty/latest-e/schedule/proceedings-e.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2006). When witnesses or proceedings raise security problems, the screened images and voices
are scrambled. See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at Rule 75(B)(i)(c) (Measures for the
Protection of Victims and Witnesses).
42. Beginning in 1987, the New York State Legislature authorized courts to use discretion but to
permit on occasion televising of certain hearings. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 218 (McKinney 2005) (provid-
ing that notwithstanding other sections of New York law, the chief judge of the state could create an
experimental program "in which presiding trial judges, in their discretion, may permit audio-visual
coverage of civil and criminal court proceedings, including trials"); 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
§§ 131.1-131.13 (1995) (providing implementing procedures). See generally N.Y. STATE COMM. TO
REVIEW AUDIO-VISUAL COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, AN OPEN COURTROOM: CAMERAS IN
NEW YORK COURTS (1997) (recommending the use of cameras in courts and including an overview of
usage in other states).
That provision came atop another New York law, generally banning televising of proceedings.
Section 218 also included sunset provisions. The state legislature did reauthorize the experiment a few
times but in 1997 let the sunset provisions take effect. In 2005, the State's highest court concluded that
no constitutional right existed to televise a trial and hence that the decision rested with the legislature.
See Courtroom Television Network LLC v. New York, 833 N.E.2d 1197 (N.Y. 2005) (upholding New
York's Civil Rights Law section 52, prohibiting most audiovisual coverage of courtroom proceedings).
In other words, while the provision for television remains in the New York statutes and regulations, it
has been superseded by other laws.
43. See CAL. R. CT. 980 (providing that photography, recording, and broadcasting courtroom
proceedings may occur if "executed in a manner that ensures that the fairness and dignity of the pro-
ceedings are not adversely affected," and that judges are to decide whether to permit media coverage by
considering more than a dozen factors including the "[p]rivacy rights of all participants,... including
witnesses, jurors, and victims"), available at http://wwwcourtinfo.ca.gov/rules/titlethree/titlethree.pdf.
Local rules provide additional procedures. See, e.g., L.A. SUPER. CT. R. 4.1 ("Recording and Photo-
graphing in the Courthouse"). In contrast, some federal district court rules prohibit photographs or
broadcasting of judicial proceedings. See, e.g., S.D. CA. Civ. R. 83.7; C.D. CAL. R. 83.6.
44. See Statement of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain on Behalf of the Judicial Conference of the
United States Regarding S. 829 as Applied to Federal Trial Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/testimony/exhibit4CameraTest05.pdf (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee); Bills Would Bring Rent Relief to Judiciary, Allow Cameras in Courts, Shape
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erally to court dockets and files45 relies on constitutional commitments an-
chored in the First Amendment and the Due Process Clauses, coupled with
common law practices and, when applicable, mandates in state constitutions
and in state and federal legislation.
Yet, over the last several decades, new modes of dispute resolution and
new venues for adjudication have diluted the opportunities for effective public
access. As of 2002, a trial started in fewer than two of one hundred civil cases
filed in federal courts. As a smaller percentage of cases are going to trial than
had been in the past, commentators have raised concerns about the "vanishing
trial. ' '46 Further, while the number of cases appealed has risen, the processes
of decision on appeal have also become less open to the public. Oral argu-
ments are not held in cases. Summary dispositions are commonplace and, as
of 2001, only about one fifth of decisions rendered by the federal appellate
courts were described as "for publication.
'47
Judicial Security and Review, and Create Inspector General, 38 THIRD BRANCH 3 (May 2006), avail-
able at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/05-06/rentbill/index.html (discussing Judicial Conference policy to
permit appellate courts, at their option, to televise oral arguments but to oppose "cameras in federal trial
courtrooms"). The Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2005, S. 829, 109th Cong. (March 30, 2006),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov, would authorize district judges to permit, at their discretion, the
televising of proceedings.
In February of 1996, the trial of a defendant charged with bombing the Murrah Federal Build-
ing in Oklahoma City was moved to Denver, Colorado. The trial judge then declined to provide for
broadcasting the proceedings. But, in April of 1996, Congress included in its enactment of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) a provision that, when a trial is moved "out of the
[s]tate" and more than 350 miles from its original venue, the trial judge "shall order" that it be broadcast
via closed circuit television "for viewing by such persons the court determines have a compelling
interest in doing so and are otherwise unable to do so." See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 235, 110 Stat. 1214, 1246-47 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10608
(2000)).
45. See supra note 34 (discussing Richmond Newspapers, and Hartford Courant). Whether that
presumption includes exchanges beyond live testimony is debated, as can be seen by comparing several
of the essays in this Symposium. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice:
It's Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463
(2006); Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 357
(2006); Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to
Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375 (2006); Richard L. Marcus, A
Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery is
Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2006). See also infra notes 117-63 and accompany-
ing text.
46. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-60 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial]. As he explains, in 1962, 11.5 percent of the civil cases were tried; both the proportion
and absolute numbers of trials have declined. Id.
47. See generally Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the
U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1465 (2004); Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anas-
tasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV.
399 (2002); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the
Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and to Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 757 (1995). "Published" opinions can be as short as one word-affirmed. See Pether, supra,
at 1465, n.139.
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The declining percentage of cases tried, the cut-backs in oral arguments,
and the number of decisions denoted as "not for publication" are in part aimed
at responding to the pressures generated by the large number of litigants seek-
ing decisions. But changes at both trial and appellate levels also derive from
decades of reconfiguration of adjudication. Beginning in the late 1930s, with
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pretrial processing
(including discovery, judicial management, and promotion of settlement)
shifted the work of trial judges from courtrooms to chambers. 48 With the rise
of the administrative state and a growing commitment that individuals have
rights against the state and to be protected by the state, venues for adjudica-
tion multiplied. Not only have many more judges and staff attorneys been
added to courthouses, but administrative agencies have become "court" sys-
tems, hosting a volume of adversarial proceedings that far outstrips what takes
place in the federal trial courts around the United States.49
These changes require consideration of how the practices of openness in
courts have-and will--change over time, whether certain functions per-
formed by open courts can be provided by other institutions, and whether new
methods of information-forcing should be crafted in order to make public that
which has become private through changing modes of resolution. For exam-
ple, during eras when few institutions kept secure records of land transfers or
of changes in personal status (such as citizenship, marriage, and adoption),
courts provided social services not otherwise available. Today, archival and
evidentiary systems in places such as libraries, municipal centers, and banks
permit verification and provide repositories that make certain court-based
record keeping unnecessary or duplicative.
Further, while courts continue through public trials to provide the social
good of producing a stated narrative (documented through transcripts, pro-
A new federal rule, prospective in application, will require that litigants be able to cite to
decisions, whether deemed "published" or not. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (approved on April 12, 2006 by
the Supreme Court and, absent congressional action, to apply in December of 2006, but only to opinions
issued after January 1 of 2007 and stating that courts may not "prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been designated as 'unpub-
lished,' 'not for publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like"). See Supreme Court
Action: Rules and Amendments Approved 4/12/06, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules. See
also ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, CITING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS (Fed. Judicial
Ctr., 2005) (surveying judges and lawyers about their attitudes toward the then proposed new rule and
reviewing decisions including some that cited unpublished opinions), and discussion, infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
48. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
49. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puz-
zles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 800 fig.2 (2004) [hereinafter
Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing], and infra text accompanying notes 94-99.
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ceedings, and exhibits 50) about a particular event,51 courts are one of many
government-based investigatory mechanisms available. Other institutions-
from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission to blue-ribbon
investigatory panels focused on tragedies such as 9/1 1-also serve that func-
tion.52
But courts offer something different than do such specially-convened
commissions. Courts do not rely on ad hoc enabling acts or national traumas
to prompt their creation. Courts are extant institutions, providing their services
for ordinary, daily conflicts as well as for extraordinary moments. Courts
enable one to see both the repetition of certain kinds of conflicts as well as the
variations in response. By knowing and seeing many claims of right, the
judgments made, and the forms of sanctions imposed, a range of individuals
and of groups can debate what sanctions are appropriate and, more basically,
what the underlying norms ought to be.
Recent examples of public courts' contributions to norm creation include
the development of prohibitions on sexual harassment and on domestic vio-
lence. Both kinds of actions were tolerated (if sadly so) until recently, when
they came to be understood as deserving of state-based penalties. Courtroom
dramas, intersecting with legislative action, mapped the kinds of injuries in-
curred and helped to delineate the scope of rights enforced. 53 And of course,
judgments by courts not only generate but can also limit rights. Illustrative
here is the political success of arguments that many tort victories are predi-
cated on "junk science," manipulated evidence, and deceived juries.54 That
contested view, interacting with assertions that insurance premiums escalated
as a consequence, has helped to support new laws imposing caps on dam-
ages-reforms that some praise and others bemoan. 55 In short, the public
50. The Nuremburg Trials, whose sixtieth anniversary was marked in November of 2005, are
exemplary. See BBC News, Germany Marks Nuremberg Tribunals,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4453790.stm (Nov. 20, 2005).
51. See Resnik, A Public Dimension, supra note 33; Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and
Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 155
(1999).
52. See, e.g., MARTHA MrNOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investi-
gatory Commissions and Executive Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419 (2005).
53. See Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and Insuring Against
the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 247 (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
54. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
But see Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 731-32 (1998) (describing media distortion of cases, including the litigation around
the scaldingly-high temperatures of coffee served at the restaurant chain, McDonald's).
55. See Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The Jury as Scapegoat, 38 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1267 (2005).
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norm production function serves both to open up and to close off avenues of
recovery.
In sum, norms of openness in courts are not only about access to infor-
mation but also embody understandings of what law is and how it is made.
Open adjudication is a technique of performing a commitment that disputants
are equal (or of marking that such commitments do not encompass all per-
sons, but may be limited to "citizens" or others with a certain status). Open
processes may license state power as well as make it possible to understand
the rationales for its exercise. By obliging differently-situated disputants to
exchange information, court-based processes can alter the respective power of
each. Further, through open processes, courts make plain the fluidity of ap-
propriate solutions and remedies as well as of the underlying rights.
Openness undermines the ability of the government to control the social
meaning of conflicts and their resolutions. 56 Patent procedures can teach that
conflicts do not belong exclusively to the disputants or to the government.
The public as an audience has an important role in witnessing, in interpreting,
in owning, and in disowning what has occurred.
III. INVESTING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRODUCTION AND DISCLOSURE
Translating these aspirations into contemporary practices is the current
challenge. Given the prominence of federal adjudication and the recent rule-
making changes on electronic discovery, the federal system provides the con-
text for my discussion. But explanation is appropriate about why rulemaking
in the federal courts has both a saliency and an influence disproportionate to
its share of litigation. The bulk of America's lawsuits-many millions of
cases-occur in state, not federal, courts.57 Further, the fifty states are free to
make their own rules, consistent with constitutional minima. Yet, through the
confluence of several factors during the twentieth century, the federal courts
became a center of publicly-based dispute resolution.
56. As Foucault detailed, government lost control literally in that at times the public processes of
executions were sites in which crowds turned into mobs sometimes animated by protests of verdicts or
punishments. FOUCAULT, supra note 12, at 59-65.
57. More than 300,000 civil and criminal filings occur annually in federal district courts, as well
as more than 1.5 million bankruptcy filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2005, at 14 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 JUDICIAL BUSINESS],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/front/judicialbusiness.pdf. State totals vary depending
on whether one counts traffic violations as well as many other kinds of disputes in the tally. Excluding
traffic cases, one tally counts about forty-five million filings annually in the state systems. See
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, & NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS' COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2004, at 13-14
(2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2004-Files/EWOverviewFinal_2.pdf.
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Specifically, in the 1930s, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure invented an obligation-called "discovery," entailing the exchange of
information (orally and in writing) and the production of records-that not
only multiplied the information available to the parties but created the possi-
bility for others to learn more details, in advance of trial, through the dispu-
tants' filings. Those Rules came into being because Congress gave to the
federal judiciary the authority to make national procedural rules, just as Con-
gress also increased the number of judicial officers and the kind and array of
federal rights.58 The Rules' innovations were part and parcel of a project be-
gun in the 1920s to expand federal judicial capacity. While some argue that
the dissemination of information through the system of discovery was inad-
vertent,59 the normative instruction provided by the 1938 Federal Rules sug-
gests otherwise. The then-new Federal Rules reiterated the themes of other
legal projects of that era, eager to facilitate national economic capacities, wel-
coming of some kinds of regulation and embodying beliefs that fact-based
inquiries were useful methods to achieve just results.60
The 1938 Federal Rules, expressive of and coupled with an impressive
investment in the infrastructure of the federal courts, not only governed "prac-
tice and procedure" 61 but also represented a political commitment to federal
power through adjudication. In the wake of the Depression, many saw federal
governance as a necessary and desirable response to political and economic
conditions. The expansion of federal jurisdiction and uniform federal proc-
esses were mechanisms by which to enforce the national legal regime and to
enhance the development of national markets. Over the decades, Congress
authorized litigants to bring a host of new claims involving civil rights, envi-
ronmental rights, consumers' rights, and workers' rights. Congress also
enlarged the power of federal prosecutors to pursue criminal actions. Federal
procedure needs thus to be understood as a part of a larger national constitu-
tional project, relying in part on equipping individuals and groups to come to
court as rights-seekers and upon judges to determine in public the obligations
of disputants.
58. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, 42 Stat. 837. In 1934, Congress authorized the
United States Supreme Court to promulgate federal procedural rules that had the power to displace local
practices with national norms. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)). The classic articles on their creation are Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 943-45, 955 (1987), and Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
59. See Marcus, supra note 45.
60. See generally Judith Resnik, Procedure's Projects, 23 Ctv. JUST. Q. 273 (Adrian Zuckerman
ed., Symposium Volume, Sweet and Maxwell 2004).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
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The import of the Rules-as a vehicle for adjudication's expansion as a
visible mechanism of regulation-can be mapped through the growing sizes
of the federal courts' dockets and budgets. Between the 1960s and the 1990s,
caseloads within the federal system tripled, as hundreds of new statutory
causes of action were enacted. 62 In terms of funding, Congress provided sub-
stantial resources to the federal courts, whose budget grew from about $250
million in the early 1960s to the more recent figure of about $4.2 billion.63
The conceptual foundation of this regime is a Due Process model of pro-
cedure. 64 Due Process Procedure endows state officials with power that is
legitimated through obligations that dispositive decisions be explained by
findings of fact and conclusions of law.65 When that model of procedure was
coupled with open court files and access to filed discovery materials, the fed-
eral courts became a kind of fabulous "document depository," an excellent
resource from which to gather information.
The federal courts were not only the receivers of information but also the
producers and systemizers of knowledge. In 1939, the Federal Courts gained
an Administrative Office; in the late 1960s, the Federal Judiciary Center was
created to focus on research and education.66 As of 2003, the annual budget of
the Administrative Office was about sixty-two million dollars, with the Fed-
eral Judicial Center receiving about twenty million dollars.67 The import of
those allocations can be seen in the data about the sealing of court records that
is the basis for one of the contributions to this Symposium, 68 as well as in
many other research projects conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. With
such resources, the federal judiciary produces a monthly newsletter, called
The Third Branch, begun in 1968 and now disseminated in print and through
62. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 957-58, 958 n.119 (2000).
63. See Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 46, at 501-05 (discussing and graphing the
growth of judicial expenditures on the federal courts from $246 million in 1962 to $4.254 billion-both
in 1996 dollar values--over a forty-year span); Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra
note 49, at 791-804 (discussing the wealth of the federal courts as compared to the state courts and
administrative courts).
64. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 9, at 600-05; Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
65. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See generally Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
66. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (2000) (Administrative Office); 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (2000)
(Federal Judicial Center).
67. The FY 2003 Budget and the Federal Judiciary, 35 THIRD BRANCH 2 (March 2003), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/marc03ttb/mar03ttb/budget.html.
68. Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement Agreements, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
439 (2006).
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the web. 69 The Administrative Office is another font of data compiled annu-
ally and found in the yearly publications of The Judicial Business of the
United States Courts, as well as in the many charts and tables that detail fil-
ings by kind of case, by district, and by circuit.70
The federal budget allocations for courts are used to support an adminis-
trative apparatus with its central staff housed in the Thurgood Marshall Build-
ing, a new major Washington building opened in 1992 across from Union
Station.71 From there, senior administrators oversee the more than 30,000
federal judicial staff supporting some 1,700 federal district, magistrate, bank-
ruptcy, and appellate judges who are dispersed in some 800 locations nation-
wide. 72 One estimate, focused on the ratio between staff and life-tenured
judges only, identified ninety-two support personnel per judge.73 Such per-
sonnel are the predicate to the production, collection, tabulation, and position-
ing of data about the 300,000 civil and criminal trial level filings, the more
than a million and a half bankruptcy petitions, and the sixty-five thousand or
so appellate filings each year.74 And the availability of such information, in
turn, makes the federal courts so appealing as a resource for research and as a
window into some of the conflicts in this country.
The relative (not the absolute) riches of the federal courts can be seen
through a comparison of funding levels for research on state courts, whose
caseloads number in the millions; states are the venues for most of the na-
tion's court-based litigation. 75 In addition to whatever research is undertaken
by individual states,76 the National Center for State Courts has a budget of
69. See The Third Branch: The Newsletter of the Federal Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (for The Third Branch online); Jill
Ann Duffy & Elizabeth Ardella Laub Lambert, Researching the Supreme Court of the United States:
Available Resources for Commonly Asked Questions, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., 2000. no. 2, at
25, 37, available at: http://www.supremecourthistory.org/06_research-06_602.html (on the beginning
of the publication in 1968).
70. See, e.g., U.S. District Court-Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cmsd2004.pl (select "All District Courts") (2004).
71. The depth and breadth of activities are well summarized in a recent publication. See RUSSELL
WHEELER, A NEW JUDGE'S INTRODUCTION To FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (Fed. Judicial
Ctr., 2003).
72. See Understanding the Federal Courts, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, at
1-4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/understanding-courts/80016.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
73. See William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at 30,
31, 33.
74. See 2005 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 57, at 11.
75. What counts as a "case" varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and because each state collects
its data individually, cross-state comparisons are complex. See Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra
note 46, at 506-07.
76. I have not located any national compilation of the total outlays spent in administrative support,
research, and teaching for each state's judiciary. Some raw numbers are available but comparing out-
lays (state-to-state or state-to-federal) is difficult because of variations in sizes of judiciaries, dockets,
population rates, legal rights, and infrastructure.
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under twenty-five million dollars, which also funds the work of the National
Conference of State Supreme Court Justices. 77 The State Justice Institute, the
other national organization devoted to the state courts, has even more limited
funds, under four million dollars in 2005.78
In contrast, between the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts and the Federal Judicial Center, some eighty million dollars provides
annually for education, research, and the many clerical services throughout
the country. 79 And despite these resources, many members of the federal
judiciary are gravely concerned that these courts are seriously under-funded,
putting at risk their capacity to sustain current services. 80
For example, in 1999-2000, the California judiciary received some $118 million for its Judi-
cial Council, which has a mandate that includes administration, teaching, and research, and therefore is
somewhat similar to that of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and of the Federal Judicial
Center. California trial courts deal with about eight million cases a year, as contrasted with the federal
docket of about 300,000 civil and criminal filings and one and one-half million bankruptcy petitions in
the federal courts. See supra note 57, and Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 46, at 546 tbl.A-
I l(civil filings), 554 tbl.A-17 (criminal defendants), 558 tbl.A-20 (bankruptcy filings). California's
judiciary is comparable in size if not somewhat larger than that of the federal courts. California has
about 1,500 trial judges, and another 400 commissioners and referees. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FACT SHEET: CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL BRANCH 1-3 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/caljudbranch.pdf.
In contrast, in New Jersey where approximately seven million cases are filed each year, the
2004 judiciary budget was $502.2 million, with $12.6 million spent on administration and $2.5 million
on public affairs and education. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATE OF NEW JERSEY BUDGET:
FISCAL YEAR 2003-2004, at D-513 to 514 (2003), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/omb/publications/04budget/pdf/98.pdf.
77. See Summary of Income and Expense, COURTING THE FUTURE: NCSC 04 ANN. RPT. (Nat'l
Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va. 2005) at 24, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/DComni/Images/04AnnualReport.pdf. About half of that amount ($14.7
million) comes from federal grants and contracts, while $10.3 million comes from assessments and
consultations that are paid by the states. Association, service, and tuition fees result in about $2.6
million more.
78. The State Justice Institute was established in 1984. At some points, its funding was about
thirteen million dollars annually. See Attorney General's Evaluation Finds SJI "Effective," 13 SJI
NEWS I (Fall 2002); U.S. ATT'Y GEN., REPORT ON THE STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE PURSUANT TO
PUBLIC LAW 107-109, at 9-10 (2002), available at http://www.statejustice.org/pdf/SJI%2OReport.pdf.
More recently, SJI faced extinction but survived with the allocation of smaller sums. See S.I1 Reborn!
Science, State, Justice, and Commerce Conference Report Crosses House Floor, SJI NEWS EXTRA (SJI,
Alexandria, Va.), Fall 2005, available at http://www.statejustice.org./pdf/SJI%20E-News-November-
Extra-.pdf (reporting on a $3.5 million appropriation in November of 2005).
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Of the total 2005 budget of $5.43 billion, the
Administrative Office reported that, within the eighty percent allocated for court salaries and expenses,
rental costs were about twenty percent, salaries and benefits for judges and staff about sixty-five per-
cent. See Where the Money Goes: A Look at How the Judiciary's FY 2005 Budget is Divided, 37 THIRD
BRANCH 1 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb05ttb/budget/index.html.
80. See Judiciary Seeks to Avert Cuts, 37 THIRD BRANCH 1 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/nov05rtb/avertcuts/index.html. (describing concerns that the budget of less
than 5.8 billion dollars for 2005 does not permit the judiciary to carry out minimally necessary func-
tions); Courts Work Hard to Serve Public Despite Resource Challenges, 37 THIRD BRANCH 3 (Nov.
2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/nov05ttb/challenges/index.html (describing the reduc-
tion in hours and in sites of operations in light of budget constraints).
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IV. DIVESTING: DELEGATION, OUTSOURCING, AND INTERNALIZATION
For some, an array of venues and personnel in federal and state courts
and agencies that provide adjudicative services is to be celebrated. For others,
growing dockets are a source of dismay. While the number of life-tenured
judges has increased significantly over the last century, Congress did not pro-
vide-and the federal judiciary did not press for-the hundreds of additional
life-tenured judges who would have been necessary to respond to demand for
adjudicatory services generated through the interaction of democratic equality
norms, new statutory rights, and judicial interpretations. Rather, public and
private actors developed three strategies-delegation and devolution, out-
sourcing, and revamping internal procedures-to channel disputes elsewhere
and to alter the ways in which they were processed. The enforcement of many
rights has been relocated outside of courts and the process refocused on reso-
lution through conciliation.
A. Agency Adjudication
Over the course of the twentieth century, lawmakers have created new
kinds of judges and new venues for judging, both within and outside of the
federal courts. Included are magistrate and bankruptcy judges,81 special tax
court judges,82 Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) working under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA),83 and hundreds of hearing officers serving as
judges inside agencies but outside the protective parameters of the APA. The
impact of that delegation can be seen by comparing the number of adversarial
hearings in administrative agencies with those taking place in federal court-
houses.
As discussed above, the Litigation Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion launched the research project, The Vanishing Trial,84 to consider the
rising filing rates coupled with declining trial rates, such that now, of one
hundred federal civil cases begun, fewer than two are resolved by trial.85 The
81. Discussion of their roles and number can be found in Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes
His Justice ": Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Colum-
bia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 614-15 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Inventing the Federal District
Courts].
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(a) (2000), creating "special trial judges," appointed by the Chief Judge
of the Tax Court and distinct from Tax Court judges themselves who are appointed by the President and
serve a fifteen-year, renewable term, per 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b), (e).
83. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000)).
84. See Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, supra note 46, at 459 n.* (discussing the impetus for the
project).
85. Id. at 459.
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declining rate contrasts with increased filings, now around 350,000 civil and
criminal cases a year. Moreover, on the civil docket, 4,569 civil trials took
place in 2002, in contrast to 1962, when 5,802 trials occurred.86 Looking at
the aggregate picture, using data from 2001, and relying on the Administrative
Office's definition of a trial as all proceedings, civil and criminal, before Arti-
cle III judges that are "contested hearings at which evidence is presented"
whether or not tried to judgment, Article III judges presided at about 13,500
trials. 87 Turning to all proceedings involving the taking of evidence and in-
cluding cases before district, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges, in 2001,
about 85,000 such proceedings took place. 88 As for public access, one as-
sumes that these evidentiary processes occurred in courtrooms open to visi-
tors.
Another way to understand how much the public can watch proceedings
in court is to consider data on courtroom usage that were developed when the
federal judiciary requested funds for the building of more courthouses. During
the last several years, some members of Congress have expressed skepticism
about budgeting for more courthouse construction. Repeatedly, they have
questioned8 9 the current custom that each federal judge has a courtroom of his
86. Id. at 461 (also noting that the drop has not been constant but rather was "recent and steep").
87. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 25 (2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus200l/front/2001artext.pdf (specifying that 13,558 trials were conducted
by Article III judges, both active and senior) [hereinafter 2001 JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. As for the defini-
tion cited in the text, the Administrative Office defines "trial" in statistical compilations to include
proceedings that result in "jury verdicts or other final judgments" and "contested hearings at which
evidence is presented." Id. at 24-25.
In 2004, the absolute number of trials declined to 12,938. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 23
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/front/JudicialBusiness.pdf. [hereinafter 2004
JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. Civil filings increased that year over the previous year-by eleven percent on the
civil side and by about 380 cases on the criminal side. Id. at 14.
88. Magistrate judges presided at 10,663 proceedings, including 1,079 civil cases tried with the
consent of the parties, 589 misdemeanors, 4,768 petty offense trials, 3,690 evidentiary hearings, and
537 mental competency proceedings. Bankruptcy judges presided at 67,140 adversary proceedings.
2001 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 87, at 25, 30.
89. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-1005 (Conf. Rep. Accompanying H.R. 4942, Making Appropria-
tions for the Government of the District of Columbia and Other Activities), U.S. House of Rep. 106th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 287-88 (Oct. 25, 2000) ("[A]ny reduction in the number of courtrooms and associ-
ated court space could significantly reduce rental payments, which continue to consume an inordinate
amount of the Judiciary's available resources.").
The federal judiciary pays rent-the amount of which constituted twenty percent of its 2005
court services' dollars-to the General Services Administration, which is the division of the federal
government that is the statutory owner of the buildings. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-673, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ON PROJECT COST AND SIZE CHANGES
WOULD HELP TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT 8 (2005) (describing the judiciary as reporting that rent ac-
counts "for just over 20 percent of its operating budget" and the expectation that the amount would
increase to 25 percent by 2009); GSA's Public Building and Courthouse Program: Hearing before the
S. Committee on Environment and Public Works, 105th Cong. 37 (1998) (statement of Robert A. Peck,
2006] 543
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
or her own.90 Such inquiries have led to a series of commissioned studies on
Comm'r, Public Buildings Service), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/
senate09shl05.html (follow hyperlink for S. Hrg. 105-921) (discussing that the PBS is the "largest
commercial-style real estate organization in the United States," that it funds its budget from rent pay-
ments from tenants, which are agencies of the federal government, and that rents are set to approximate
commercial rates).
In 2006, members of Congress introduced a rent-relief proposal, to change the calculation of
rents from commercial rates to one based on "the actual costs incurred by GSA to maintain and operate
federal court buildings." See Senator Specter Acts to Provide Rent Relief for Judiciary, 38 THIRD
BRANCH I (Mar. 2006) (noting the introduction of S.2292, similar to HR47 10, introduced by Represen-
tative F. James Sensenbrenner and that both bills, known as a "Judiciary Rent Reform Act," would
change what the Judiciary is paying, which was $926 million in fiscal year 2005 but according to the
bill's sponsors, would have been "only $426 million").
90. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-70, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: SUFFICIENT
DATA AND ANALYSIS WOULD HELP RESOLVE THE COURTROOM-SHARING ISSUE, 57 app. IV (2000)
[hereinafter GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION 2000] (Comments from the Chair, Judicial Confer-
ence, Committee on Security and Facilities, Oct. 31 2000) (underscoring the "value of unfettered access
to a courtroom and its importance to the fair and efficient administration of justice").
Conflict between Congress and the judiciary on this issue has prompted several reports. A
commissioned Ernst and Young Study came under fire from the General Accounting Office (GAO),
which described the Ernst and Young report as flawed because it was based upon a mathematical
formula of questionable validity (lacking "data, rationale, or analytical basis") and incorrectly used
earlier data. Id. at 8, 16. Ernst and Young concluded that courtroom sharing would not be feasible in
districts with fewer than five courtrooms and would result in serious scheduling problems in places with
six to ten courtrooms. Id. at 11. The GAO commented that ninety-one percent of the courthouses fall
within the category of five or fewer courtrooms. But, "about 40 percent of all current, active district
judges are located in the remaining 9 percent of the courtrooms." Id. at 19.
Another study, from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), modeled a reduction in court-
room space while keeping trial rates at their 1995 levels as well as an increase in trial rates while keep-
ing the numbers of courtrooms and of trials per judge constant. Both models suggested that a small
delay in trials (ranging from about two to four percent) would result. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
THE ONE COURTROOM, ONE-JUDGE POLICY: A PRELIMINARY REVIEW 10-12 & tbl.2 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter CBO, ONE COURTROOM]. Further, with the assumption of a greater number of trials "but the same
number of courtrooms and trials per judge," the CBO model predicted that "courtrooms would still be
unused for almost forty percent of the available time." Id. at 12. The judiciary responded by eliciting
policy statements from each of the federal circuits about the plausibility of courtroom sharing, by
raising the possibility that senior or visiting judges might share courtrooms, and, in a few instances, by
judges sharing courtrooms. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-341, COURTHOUSE
CONSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ON COURTROOM SHARING 21-39 (2002) [hereinafter GAO
COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION 2002].
Through 2003, the judiciary's leadership remained committed to individual courtrooms,
produced through new construction and through renovations. The argument is that each judge's access
to an available courtroom makes for better and more efficient justice. Further, the judicial committees
are concerned about the rising filing rates and new judgeships that would be likely during the interval
from a proposed project to its completion. Reflective of that view was a construction proposal for 2002-
2006 that projected forty-five new or renovated facilities at a cost estimated to be $2.6 billion. Id. at 3.
Each courtroom, with its adjacent office space, was estimated as costing some $1.5 million. See CBO,
ONE COURTROOM, supra at 2-3.
The economic retrenchment in the wake of 9/11, coupled with heightened security risks,
reshaped the plans for courthouse construction. As Congress hesitated, the judiciary scaled back its
proposals and retreated from several of the sought-after projects. Moreover, with some judges taking
senior status and others appointed, a few districts provided for judges to share courtrooms. See The
Judiciary's Ability to Pay for Current and Future Space Needs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management of the H. Comm. on Transpor-
tation and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 92-98 (2005) (prepared statement of Hon. Jane R. Roth, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on Security and Facili-
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courtroom usage, as well as to a debate about how to define when a court-
room is in fact "in use." A 1997 General Services Administration study de-
fined courtroom usage as "any activity" (including but not limited to trials) for
any portion of a day9 1-a measure that the GSA later noted was generous in
counting "lights on" for less than a couple of hours as a day of use.92 With
that metric, the GSA found a fifty-four percent usage rate of available days in
the sixty-five courtrooms at the seven locations that were studied.93
One could conclude from these data that not much conflict exists, and
hence, that there is not much to see. But by enlarging the context to include
the numbers of evidentiary proceedings in federal agencies, one learns about a
much higher volume of trial-like proceedings. 94 The Social Security Admini-
stration is, as Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers recently described, the only
"program of the federal goverment... [that] serves over ten million benefi-
ciaries [and that] involves expenditures that [were] $100 billion in FY
2002."95 According to Verkuil and Lubbers, the "SSA adjudication system is
probably the largest system of trial-type adjudication in the world."'96
Yet despite the SSA's import and economic girth, a look at the website
of this agency reveals relatively little about the bases for resolution of its
ties), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleasefRothO62105.pdf (describing a two-year
moratorium on more than thirty-five courthouse construction projects, a review of the judiciary's design
standards, and a reevaluation of space needs including renewed consideration of the question of indi-
vidual courtrooms for each jurist).
91. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-39, COURTROOM CONSTRUCTION:
BETTER COURTROOMS USE DATA COULD ENHANCE FACILITY PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING 8-10
(1997) (relying on 1995 data from a sample analyzing the use of sixty-five courtrooms in seven district
courts and crediting "each courtroom with one day of usage for all days that the records showed that
there was any activity") [hereinafter GAO COURTROOM CONSTRUCTION 1997]. Also noted was that in
all but two locations, "courtrooms were used more often for nontrial purposes than they were for trials."
Id. at 11. To determine the nature of the activity, the researchers reviewed the calendars and minute
order books of court clerks. Id. at 39 app. I (Objectives, Scope and Methodology). In a related letter
from Bernard L. Unger, the Director of the Government Business Operations Issues for the GSA, the
GSA detailed the use of courts for "nontrial use only, two hours or less." See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-59R, B-275225, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: INFORMATION ON THE USE OF
DISTRICT COURTROOMS AT SELECTED LOCATIONS 9 tbl.l.3 (1997), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/papr2pdf. 158673.pdf.
92. GAO COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION 2000, supra note 90, at 8, 18 (disagreeing with an analy-
sis by Ernst and Young and noting that the "lights-on measure overstated the numbers of hours judges
actually spent in the courtrooms" and that the GAO's measure was "actually a measure of workdays
when there was any use at all, even if the events lasted for less than an hour," id. at 8).
93. GAO COURTROOM CONSTRUCTION 1997, supra note 91, at 10.
94. Comparing proceedings in courts and agencies is complex. More than a decade ago, Paul
Verkuil estimated that "ALJs probably decide more 'cases' each year than do their federal judicial
counterparts." Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1341, 1343 (1992).
95. Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social
Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 738 (2003).
96. Id. at 759; see also id. at 738 (noting that "[n]o other program of the federal government
produces such a large and complicated caseload for the federal courts to review").
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cases, nor does the website make clear the various kinds and quantities of
dispositions. Only through able research assistance and calls to many sources
could data on the number of evidentiary hearings be assembled-which we
(Bertrall Ross, Jennifer Peresie, Natalie Ram, and I) estimate to be about
500,000 a year.97 Coupling data from the SSA with information from three
other major federal agencies deciding disputes about immigration, veterans'
benefits, and equal employment within the federal government, 98 and attempt-
ing to identify only adjudicative proceedings in which a hearing officer or a
judge listens to oral presentations (sworn or unsworn) so as to apply legal
rules to factual claims, we estimate that roughly two-thirds of a million such
proceedings take place annually in these four high-volume federal agencies. 99
But these many evidentiary hearings are invisible to most members of the
public who would be hard-pressed to find the rooms inside the agency build-
ings where the proceedings occur. Even if able to locate where to go, specta-
tors are not permitted to attend many of these proceedings. 100
97. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 46-47 (2004), available
at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/finance/2004/Full FY04-Par.pdf. This number represents the hearings
"processed by OHA [Office of Hearings and Appeals]." See also Resnik, Morphing, Migrating, and
Vanishing, supra note 49, at 799. Thanks are also owed to Michael Asunow, Jerry Mashaw, Elizabeth
Magill, Steven Croley, Jeffrey Lubbers, Gene Fidell, Camilla Tubbs, and Gene Coakley for help in
locating information.
98. To determine the number of evidentiary proceedings involving immigration, we looked at the
number of proceedings before immigration judges. The definition of "court proceedings" under the
relevant regulations are those in which "aliens appear before an Immigration Judge, and either contest
or concede the charges against them." EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FY 2004 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at BI, D1, available at
http//www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy04syb.pdf. Complainants can present direct evidence, and the
immigration judge renders a decision based on the evidentiary record. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.12-1003.37
(2005). In our count of EEOC hearings involving federal employment, we looked to those in which a
complainant presents evidence and the Administrative Law Judge "issue[s] a decision on the merits of
the complaint." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1603.214, 1603.217 (2005). For determining hearings in the Board of
Veteran Appeals, we considered those in which the Board "receive[s] argument and testimony relevant
and material to the.. . issue" in order to make a decision on the complaint. 38 C.F.R. § 20.700 (2005).
99. Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra note 49, at 798-800 & fig.2; Natalie Ram
& Bertrall Ross, Analyzing Federal Administrative Adjudication (May 2006) (on file with the author)
(detailing questions of classification).
100. In terms of the regulatory framework permitting access, the SSA hearings are open to the
public unless the Administrative Law Judge, based on "good cause," closes a hearing. 20 C.F.R.
§ 498.215(d) (2005). Immigration hearings involve different issues, including deportation, asylum,
removal, and exclusion. With the exception of exclusion hearings and certain kinds of other proceed-
ings, immigration hearings are presumptively open. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2005) (providing that an
Immigration Judge "may place reasonable limitations upon the number in attendance at any one time
with priority being given to the press over the general public" and that hearings involving an abused
"alien spouse" may be closed); see also N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (holding that the Attorney General had the power to close
deportation hearings presenting national security issues). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a First Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings
existed and that a blanket directive closing them was impermissible). The EEOC limits access to those
with information relevant to the complaint. 29 CFR § 1614.109(e). As for the Board of Veterans Ap-
peals (BVA), the description of the hearings (informal, ex parte, etc.) does not detail a role for the
[Vol 81:521
2006] THE PUBLIC DIMENSIONS OF COURT-BASED PROCESSES 547
Similarly, within the legal academy, detailed knowledge about the prac-
tices and outcomes at these many proceedings is minimal. As recently noted
by the United States Supreme Court (when disapproving of a Tax Court prac-
tice that the reports of its special trial judges not be made public nor included
in records on reviewll), hearing officers' reports are routinely made part of
files.102 Yet no "reporter service" either in print or online regularly compiles
and reproduces decisions of administrative judges and hearing officers.
Rather, one would have to search case files to gather systematic information
about the various agencies and their adjudicative decisionmaking.1
03
One reason we lack data in the aggregate is the lack of funding for re-
search on agencies. The Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS), an entity created to serve as a repository of information about and
research on administrative agencies, lost its funding in the mid-1990s. 10 4 As
of this writing, some funds may be forthcoming for a modest resuscitation,
but not at the level that would enable data-gathering and the integration of
information about filings across many agencies.
105
public. 38 C.F.R. § 20.701 (2000) (stating that "only the appellant and/or his or her authorized represen-
tative may appear and present argument in support of an appeal"). The agency considers the hearings
closed and relies in part on the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, which protects
disclosure related to medical and education records. The Board of Veterans Appeals permits open
hearings only if agreed to by the claimant. See E-mail from BVA personnel to Natalie Ram, Apr. 28,
2006 (on file with the author).
See generally Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, Am. Bar. Ass'n, A Blackletter
Statement of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 17, 20 (2002) (describing
a general presumption that administrative hearings are open); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment
and the Right ofAccess to Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REv. 265 (2004).
101. Ballard v. Comm'r, 544 U.S. 46 (2005) (describing that practice as "concealment"). This
approach, dating from 1984, also left unclear whether Tax Court judges had modified, rejected, or
adopted the special trial judge's initial report. Id. at 56. Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court found
that the concealment was not authorized by the rules; therefore the Court did not reach the question of
whether what it described as the "idiosyncratic" practice of the Tax Court, if continued, would violate
due process or other federal rules. Id. at 64. In July of 2005, the Tax Court promulgated new rules,
making available the reports. See U.S. TAx CT. R. 182(e), 183 (a)-(c), available at
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/rules/new-092005.pdf (effective September 2005) (modeling a process for
proposed findings by special trial judges in Tax Court akin to that used for district court review of
proposed findings of magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)); Louise Story, Secrecy Is Lifted
in Some Tax Court Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at C1.
102. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 62 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), that "[a]ll decisions, including initial, rec-
ommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of the record" on appeal). Also in files are the findings of
magistrate judges, special masters, and bankruptcy judges. Id.
103. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS, THE FINAL REPORT, reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 859 (1994) (describing the
method for researching social security dispositions).
104. See Administrative Conference Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-596 (2000)). Funding stopped in 1995. See Toni M. Fine, A Legislative
Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19, 23
(1998).
105. See Federal Regulatory Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-401, 118 Stat. 2255 (2004)
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 591 and § 596 to authorize the appropriation of three million dollars for fiscal
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Further, because many claimants in agencies do not have lawyers, and
those who do cannot provide significant compensation for such service, pub-
lishers have not focused on marketing services to gather and disseminate in-
formation. A few special projects-such as the efforts at Hastings Law School
to assemble a database on asylum opinionsl 06-permit windows into small
subsets of the decisions made and enable law teachers and commentators to
have some basis on which to discuss content and process. On occasion, dis-
tress at agency processes and outcomes produces a body of federal appellate
law. 107 But these episodic exposures, and particularly the insights gleaned
from court oversight, provide a skewed sample of the quality and kind of
decisions rendered.
In short, and borrowing from the language of political economy, during
the course of the twentieth century, through successful efforts of both public
and private institutions and actors, the federal courts became the most promi-
nent and the best-endowed court system in the nation. When trials occur in
any of their hundreds of facilities, the public can attend. Decisions from its
jurists can be read (even if not "published" 108) through online and print ser-
vices. In contrast, a large quantum of adjudicatory-like decisionmaking goes
uncompiled, under-recorded, and minimally represented. A good many trial-
like procedures (more than two-thirds of a million evidentiary proceedings
annually in federal agencies) cannot be seen by any but the immediate partici-
pants. Delegation to agencies of adjudication may provide many benefits
(usually catalogued as including informality, lower costs, expertise, and more
year 2005 and small increases thereafter); Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Am. Bar. Ass'n Gov't
Affairs Office, to Hon. Christopher S. Bond, Chair, and Hon. Patty Murray, Ranking Member, Sub-
comm. on Transp., Treasury, the Judiciary & Hous. & Urban Dev. of the Senate Comm. on Appropria-
tions (July 1, 2005), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/unfmished/ABAletter.pdf (seeking support
for appropriation of the such sums); Randolph J. May, Bring Back ACUS, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 3, 2005, at
27 (calling for Congress to appropriate the funds authorized).
106. See Ctr. for Gender and Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal. Hastings College of the Law, Case
Law, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/law (last visited May 1, 2006) (providing access to materials from the
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies).
107. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing a "stag-
gering 40 percent" reversal rate of the 136 petitions reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals that
were resolved on the merits and concluding that "the adjudication of [immigration] cases at the admin-
istrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice"); N'Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d
494, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., concurring) ("There are no doubt many conscientious, dedicated,
and thorough immigration courts across the country. Unfortunately, their hard work is overshadowed by
the significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in reason, logic, and effort from other
immigration courts is reaching the federal circuits."); Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d
Cir. 2005) (expressing disappointment that the immigration judge "chose to attack Wang's moral
character rather than conduct a fair and impartial inquiry into his asylum claims"). See also Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J.
679 (1989) (discussing the government's response to rulings overturning Social Security adjudication).
108. See REAGAN, CITING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS, supra note 47; Pether,
supra note 47.
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judging for more claimants) but it also imposes significant costs in terms of
reducing the openness of dispute resolution processes and access to informa-
tion about both processes and outcomes predicated on claims of public rights.
B. Enforcing Contracts to Resolve Disputes Outside of Courts
In addition to delegation from one public institution to another, outsourc-
ing to private venues is another means of putting dispute resolution beyond
public purview. Private dispute resolution has a long history,109 but during
decades past, the law was ambivalent about enforcing obligations to partici-
pate in private systems that required disputants to pledge to forgo access to
public processes. Judges guarded their own monopoly power and regularly
refused to enforce compulsory arbitration contracts.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the attitudes of legis-
lators and court-based adjudicators changed. In 1925, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), recognizing arbitration contracts as enforce-
able obligations. 1 10 Yet judges sometimes declined to enforce agreements that
contained waivers of federal litigation rights and were made before actual
conflicts arose. Jurists found arbitration too flexible, too lawless, and too in-
formal when contrasted with adjudication, esteemed for its regulatory role in
monitoring adherence to national norms. 111
However, in the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court revised its ear-
lier rulings and upheld broad grants of authority to arbitrators, even when
federal statutory rights to bring lawsuits were claimed.' 12 Instead of objecting
109. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 132-33 (1992); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
110. See United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000 & Supp. III 2005)). As first enacted, it was called the "U.S. Arbi-
tration Act," but it is now commonly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act. Professors Michael
Leroy and Peter Feuille argue that the claim of historic judicial hostility to arbitration is overstated. See
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back
to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249 (2003).
111. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211
(1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?].
112. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (both upholding ex ante arbitration agreements as
sufficient despite claims of violation of federal securities and antitrust rights). Thereafter, the Court
enforced arbitration clauses despite allegations of discrimination under federal or state law. See Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991). Further, the Court has required that ambiguity about the scope of such contracts is to be de-
cided, in the first instance, by arbitrators. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); see
also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006) (overturning a decision by the
Supreme Court of Florida that because a clause of the contract failed under state law, the arbitration
2006]
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to the informality of arbitration, judges praised its flexibility. But judges did
not simply alter their attitudes toward arbitration; they also changed their
views of adjudication, which came to be described as only one of several
techniques appropriate for the resolution of disputes. 1 3 Today, law often
sends contracting parties (including employees and consumers) to mandatory
arbitration programs created by employers, manufacturers, and the providers
of goods and services.1 14
My own contract from a cell phone provider offers one such example.
Under the heading "Independent Arbitration," it reads: "Instead of suing in
court, you're agreeing to arbitrate disputes arising out of or related to this or
prior agreements.... You and we are waiving rights to participate in class
actions, including putative class actions begun by others prior to this agree-
ment .... "115
Gaining knowledge and access to such private dispute resolution proc-
esses is difficult. Professor Marc Galanter, the data collector-in-chief for The
Vanishing Trial project, noted the challenges when, in October of 2003, he
distributed to the other researchers (myself included) a thick booklet of statis-
tics that had been compiled. But the sections "Administrative Adjudication"
and "The Number of ADR Proceedings" had not been written; as he ex-
provision was unenforceable; sending the disputants to arbitration for consideration of the contract's
validity).
113. Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?, supra note 111, at 253-54.
114. See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, " Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses; The Average Consumer's Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004,
at 55. Demaine and Hensler sampled services, such as moving companies, department stores, car dealers,
hospitals, airlines, and credit card dealers and learned that about one third (fifty-seven of the 161 sampled
businesses) included arbitration clauses in their contracts. Almost seventy percent of financial services
(credit cards, accounting, banking) required arbitration. Of the fifty-two arbitration clauses analyzed, about
one-third expressly prohibited class actions. Of thirty clauses that dealt with costs, about half provided that
the consumer and service company would split the costs, unless the arbitrator decided otherwise. Id. at 58-
72.
Some constraints exist. If litigants challenge contractual obligations, courts inquire into the ade-
quacy of arbitral tribunals and sometimes find the process insufficient or the form of contracting unconscion-
able. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHiO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.
757 (2004). See also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
331 (1996); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 279; Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors:
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2004, at 253.
115. This text comes from a mailing I received in 2002 from Verizon Wireless, which also counseled
that I "read [it] carefully before filing [it] in a safe place." A copy is on file with the author. The 2006 ver-
sion-also purporting to bar aggregate arbitrations even if permitted by an ADR provider-can be found
online. See Customer Agreement, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/globalText?name=Customer-
Agreement&jspName--footer/customerAgreement.jsp. See also Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to
Sue: In Significant Legal Shift, Doctors, Gyms, Cable Services Start to Require Arbitration, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2003, at D1.
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plained, such data are "elusive." 1 6 Some private providers are free-standing
institutions (such as the American Arbitration Association that also provide
services to in-house programs); some are industry-based, and others are run
by the entity requiring the alternative. Given that range, knowledge of their
metes and bounds is very limited, and watching them at work is not an option
offered.
C. Pressing for Conciliation Inside Courts
The third method of privatization of public processes comes through the
changes in the ways in which courts themselves work. As a variety of differ-
ent kinds of concerns have converged, the movement for Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) has succeeded in winning congressional attention and in
altering court processes and doctrine.
Given the concerns of this Symposium about privacy and secrecy, of
particular relevance here are those processes that encourage settlement. The
1938 Rules did not use the term "settlement," nor did they charge judges with
the task of promoting settlements. The drafters did include a provision under
one Federal Rule (68) for an "offer of judgment,"' 1 7 and they prohibited class
actions from being "dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court."1 18 In contrast, the 2004 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure uses the word "settlement" in the texts of Rules 11,119 16, 23,120 and
26.121
116. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts 91 (Litig. Section, Am. Bar. Ass'n, Working Paper compiled in October of 2003 for the
symposium held in San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 12-14, 2003) (on file with the author).
117. Rule 68 explained that if an adverse party failed to obtain a judgment more favorable than had been
offered, a court had the power to award costs from the time the offer was made against a winning party. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 68, 308 U.S. 645, 746 (submitted in 1937 to be effective in 1938) [hereinafter 1938 FEDERAL
RULES]. The 1987 revisions substituted language of"offeree" for party but retained the model of the 1938
rules. The definition of "costs" varies depending on whether statutes also provide for shifting either costs or
attomeys' fees, sometimes defined as an element of costs and other times not. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000);
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
118. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c), 1938 FEDERAL RULES, supra note 117, 308 U.S. at 690.
119. The original Rule 11 was called "Signing of Pleadings." See 1938 FEDERAL RULES, supra note
117, 308 U.S. at 676. The current Rule 11, now called "Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers;
Representations to Court; Sanctions," provides that "[m]onetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned." FED. R. Civ. P.
11 (c)(2)(B). Further, the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes comment that Rule 11 motions should not be used
to "exact an unjust settlement" and further explain that parties "settling a case should not be subsequently
faced with an unexpected order from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have affected their
willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case."
120. The 1938 version, "Class Actions," prohibited dismissal or compromise without court approval.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), 1938 FEDERAL RULES, supra note 117, 398 U.S. at 690. The 2003 Rule has a subsec-
tion entitled "Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise," and under that subsection, the process of
2006]
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The key innovation came in 1993, when Rule 16 was amended to detail
more of the work and the power of the managerial judge, authorized to direct
"a party or its representative" to "be present or reasonably available by tele-
phone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute."' 122 Added to the
Rule's text was that the goal of such intervention was to "assist in resolving
the dispute,"'123 in contrast to the prior statement that the aim was "to resolve
the dispute." 124
Judges moved from resolution by adjudication to resolution by negotia-
tion. As the drafters explained:
Even if a case cannot be settled immediately, the judge and attorneys can
explore possible use of alternative procedures such as mini-trials, sum-
mary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitra-
tion that can lead to consensual resolution of the dispute without a full
trial on the merits.
125
Furthermore, although the notes explaining the 1983 amendment to Rule
16 had cautioned judges against imposing "settlement negotiations on unwill-
ing litigants,"' 126 the 1993 ruledrafters gave judges power (the parameters of
settlement for class actions is detailed to some extent, with more discussion in the Advisory Committee
Notes. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(e) & Advisory Committee's Notes.
121. The word "settlement" was first used in the context of Rule 26 in the 1970 Advisory Committee
notes to amendments promulgated at that time. As the Advisory Committee explained:
[D]isputes have inevitably arisen concerning the values claimed for discovery and abuses al-
leged to exist....
The Committee... invited the Project for Effective Justice of Columbia Law School to
conduct a field survey of discovery....
The Columbia Survey concludes, in general, that there is no empirical evidence to war-
rant a fundamental change in the philosophy of the discovery rules. No widespread or pro-
found failings are disclosed .... The costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a
general matter, either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation. Discovery
frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby
makes for a fairer trial or settlement. On the other hand, no positive evidence is found that
discovery promotes settlement.
Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D.
487,489-90 (1970).
In 1993, Rule 26 was again amended to provide that the parties
must, as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling conference
is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), meet to discuss the nature and basis of
their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the
case ....
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f (1993) ("Meeting of Parties: Planning for Discovery").
In 1970, Rule 26 (b)(2) made plain that parties could obtain discovery of insurance policies even
though they were neither admissible nor likely to lead to admissible evidence. Rather, disclosure was appro-
priate to enable "counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and
litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation." See FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(2) & the Advisory
Committee's Notes (1970) ("Insurance Policies").
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(16) (1993).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9)(1993) (emphasis added).
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) Advisory Committee's Notes (1993).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) Advisory Committee's Notes (1983).
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which are unclear 127) to compel participation even when parties are reluctant
to do so. As the Advisory Committee noted, the rule "acknowledges the pres-
ence of statutes and local rules or plans that may authorize use of some of
these procedures even when not agreed to by the parties."' 128
Moreover, court-based ADR has itself relied heavily on less public
modes of resolution. Trials are not the only proceedings that have "vanished"
from courts. Arbitrations, which are more trial-like than other forms of ADR
and which could provide a venue in which the public could gain knowledge of
conflicts, are also hard to find. As of 2002, ten of the ninety-four district
courts had statutory authority for both mandatory and voluntary court-
annexed arbitration programs for certain kinds of cases. But only seven of the
ten districts then had operating programs' 29-taking references for less than
eight percent of the cases on those districts' civil dockets. 130 The other three
designated "arbitration districts" had stopped providing that process because
127. See, e.g., In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a district court may
order "an unwilling party to participate in, and share the costs of, non-binding mediation" either through
local rules or statutory provisions or under its "inherent powers as long as the case is an appropriate one and
the order contains adequate safeguards"); In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1991) (concluding
that courts have inherent authority to "direct parties to produce individuals with full settlement authority at
pretrial settlement conferences"). The Novak court also concluded that such power extended to named parties
or nonparty insurers in charge of a litigation but that a judge could not order an employee of a nonparty
insurer to participate. Id. at 1407-08. The appellate court also reminded lower court judges that they lack the
power to compel parties to settle. Id. at 1405 n. 15 (citing Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Cf In re African-Am. Slave Descendants' Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d. 755, 758-60 (N.D. 11. 2003) (concluding
that where a local rule provides only for voluntary mediation and no federal statute compels mandatory
mediation, neither the Federal Rules nor a court's inherent powers should be used to require mediation).
See generally Jeffrey A. Pamess & Lance C. Cagle, Guiding Civil Case Settlement Conferences
and Their Aftermath: The Need to Amend Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218, 35 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 779 (2004)
(reviewing opinions on the enforceability of judicial insistence on requiring settlement discussions and
calling for written rules for participants in pretrial conferences); Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack,
Judicial Settlement Databases: Development and Uses, JUDGES' J., Winter, 2004, at 19 (describing efforts to
develop databases to use as parameters for "fair" settlements). For discussion about the possibility of coer-
cive uses of settlement powers before the 1983 change, see Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 48, at
412-13.
128. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) Advisory Committee's Notes (1993).
129. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 20 (2003) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2002], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/front/jdbusiness.pdf. As that report explains, courts
had the power to mandate arbitration only if the plaintiff sought no more than $150,000 in money damages.
Further, in 2002, 3,965 civil cases were referred to arbitration from seven of the ten districts authorized to do
so; that number represented a twenty percent increase over referrals the year before. Seven districts (the
Northern District of California, the Middle District of Florida, the Westem District of Missouri, the Eastern
District of New York, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District Pennsylvania, and the Western District
of Oklahoma) accounted for "all new arbitration cases in the district courts during 2002." Id. According to
staff at the Western District of Missouri, no court-annexed arbitrations have occurred since 1998 because of
the use of an early neutral evaluation program. Telephone Interview by Andrew Goldstein with staff, U.S.
Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. (Nov. 21, 2003).




they had shifted to mediation-thereby joining some forty-five other districts
then relying on activities focused on settlement of disputes. 131
Within those seven programs, relatively little public access was permit-
ted. Working with Andrew Goldstein (the author of another essay in this
Symposium132), I tried to learn about whether and how individuals who were
not parties could attend the arbitrations. The local rules of the seven district
courts were relatively uninformative. Most neither addressed the question of
whether the public has a right to be present at court-annexed arbitrations nor
specified where court-annexed arbitrations were to take place. 133
In response to phone calls to the various districts, staff in clerks' offices
provided information; in some courts, the arbitrations were held in courtrooms
if space existed or at an off-site neutral location such as an arbitrator's of-
fice. 134 As to whether non-participants could be present, the deputy clerk of
one district informed us that the proceedings were private. 135 In another dis-
trict, where the local rule provided for the arbitration hearing to take place in a
room in the courthouse, 136 a clerk explained that non-parties could attend only
with the consent of the parties and the arbitrator. 137 In one district, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, court-annexed arbitrations were listed as a part of the
court calendar and took place in the courthouse in rooms open to the pub-
lic.138
Consider then the more common forms of ADR-mediation and judge-
run settlement conferences. These activities often take place in lawyers' of-
fices and in judges' chambers. A few federal courthouse projects now include
131. Id. at 20 ("Currently, 52 percent of all U.S. district courts use federal mediation procedures to settle
cases eligible for alternative dispute resolution programs."). As Deborah Hensler has pointed out, how much
of that is what mediators would call "mediation," as contrasted with settlement conferences focused on
obtaining dispositions, is a question not yet answered. See Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We
Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, DIsP. RES. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15. See also Nancy A. Welsh,
Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787
(2001).
132. Goldstein, supra note 45.
133. Compare, e.g., W.D. Mo. R. 16.5 (entitled "Alternative Dispute Resolution" and describing the use
of neutral third parties to resolve controversies but providing no details as to where such processes occur),
with D.N.J. Clv. R. 201.1(f) (providing that a court order specify the time and place of the arbitration).
134. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 4-4 (providing that arbitrations could be held anywhere within the
physical boundaries of that district, "including a room at a federal courthouse, if available").
135. Telephone interview by Andrew Goldstein with Deputy Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of N.J.
(Nov. 14,2003).
136. SeeE.D.N.Y.CIV.R. 83.10(f).
137. Telephone interview by Andrew Goldstein with Deputy Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of
N.Y. (Nov. 14,2003).
138. Telephone interview by Andrew Goldstein with staff, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa. (Nov.
14, 2003); see also E.D. PA. R. 53.2 ("Arbitration: The Speedy Civil Trial"); 53.2(5) ("Arbitration Trial...
The trial shall take place in the United States Courthouse in a room assigned by the arbitration clerk.").
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plans to build ADR suites, 139 but at least one such room (dedicated to media-
tion in a federal district court in Portland, Oregon) is tucked inside an area that
is not regularly visited by the public. While bargaining in the shadow of the
law is a phrase often used,140 bargaining is increasingly a requirement of the
law of procedure. Also increasing are ex parte contacts between judges and
lawyers; some local rules and some case law license these exchanges in ser-
vice of the goal of promoting settlement.141 Such discussions not only take
place away from public scrutiny, they may be closed to some of the parties in
the very case at issue.
Moving from the structure of rules to contemporary court-based prac-
tices, privacy or secrecy (again depending on one's vantage point) can also
stem from party-negotiated and court-enforced terms of agreements. One
option is to bargain for privacy/secrecy through the payment of premiums or
the conditioning of settlements on nondisclosure of information. In the federal
system, parties may conclude agreements by dismissals. Filed with courts are
the notices of dismissal; separately, the parties specify the relevant terms in
contracts. Some (unknown) number of those non-filed contracts include "con-
fidentiality clauses" that prohibit disclosure of the terms to others. The fre-
quency with which reference is made in case law and commentary 142 to the
existence of such "confidential settlement agreements" and the general lack of
debate about them suggest that such confidentiality clauses are commonplace
(unlike the formally filed settlements that FJC researchers found infrequently
included sealing143).
A distinct question-again open currently to bargaining-is access to the
underlying information, produced during the course of litigation and specifi-
cally through discovery. We know that parties bargain to hide materials un-
earthed. And, anecdotal evidence supports the thesis that discovery
confidentiality clauses are routinely included as a predicate to the initial dis-
closures, making nondisclosure the baseline from which special negotiations
are required to enable the information to be revealed to others. That settlement
139. Telephone Interview with Staff Architect, U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Nov. 2005).
140. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
141. See Ex Parte Contacts: Local Rules and Ethical Obligations, Memorandum from Alison
MacKenzie and Jennifer Peresie to Judith Resnik (May 2005) (on file with the author).
142. See, e.g., Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing access to confidential settlement materials); Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 187
F.R.D. 453 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding good cause to protect disclosure of a settlement that the plaintiff had
reached in a prior lawsuit with a different defendant). See generally Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protec-
tive Orders and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427 (1991); Richard L. Marcus, The Dis-
covery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 457 (1991).
143. See FJC SEALED SETTLEMENT STUDY, supra note 6.
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may hinge on agreements to make data inaccessible can be gleaned from the
few cases that do make the press or the reported decisions.
One such headline-grabbing example was a sex-discrimination case
against a major Wall Street firm144 that had been accompanied by a good deal
of advance media coverage. One story ran under the banner: "Women of Wall
Street Get Their Day in Court."'145 Instead, the case was settled with promises
of nondisclosure not only by the individual plaintiff but also by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). As the Wall Street Journal's
reporters explained,
although the EEOC had planned to introduce statistics about women's
pay and promotion at trial, details on the alleged disparities between the
firm's male and female employees were never made public.... As part
of the settlement, the parties agreed to honor a pre-existing confidential-
ity order, designed to keep many of the documents related to the case
under wraps. 146
In addition to such party-based negotiations and court rules stemming
from ADR, other methods are available to keep information about conflicts
from the public. Many states have created a privilege for information obtained
in mediations. 147 Federal law providing for mediation has a similar feature. 148
Strategically, parties may, by bringing documents and information into a me-
diation, shelter them from subsequent disclosure in litigation. 149 Private pro-
144. See EEOC & Allison Schieffelin v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ. 8421, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12724 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2004), aff'g in part 324 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2004). Judge Ber-
man's July 8th district court opinion reviewed Magistrate Judge Ellis's rulings on pretrial motions challeng-
ing the admissibility of expert testimony about the occupational choices of women and men and workplace
practices to protect against gender bias.
145. See Patrick McGeehan, The Women of Wall Street Get Their Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2004, § 3, at 5. See also Susan E. Reed, When a Workplace Dispute Goes Very Public, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 25,
2001, § 3, at 4 (discussing the sex discrimination litigation against Merrill Lynch, its settlement with hear-
ings, and efforts by unhappy litigants to bring the issues back to public attention, including through hiring an
airplane to pull a banner, "Merrill Lynch Discriminates Against Women" through the air).
146. See Kate Kelly & Colleen DeBaise, Morgan Stanley Settles Bias Suit for $54 Million, WALL ST. J.,
July 13, 2004, at Al; see also Susan Antilla, Op-Ed, Money Talks, Women Don't, N.Y. TtMEs, July 21,
2004, at A19 (arguing that "Morgan Stanley, and all of Wall Street, scored" by keeping the statistics private).
147. See Dor6, supra note 45, at 495-97.
148. See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000) (requiring confidentiality, and specifically restricting the use of discov-
ery to force disclosure of exchanges made during administrative processes); 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2000)
(requiring district courts to provide local rules for confidentiality in ADR). Cf FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp.
2d 736 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (concluding that the provision does not prevent use of evidence disclosed at media-
tion to challenge a settlement agreement). See generally Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complemen-
tary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 553, 565-66 (2005); Note,
Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270-71 (Cal. 2004) (holding that mediation privi-
lege applies to "writings" that include analyses of test data and photographs prepared during mediation and
that a "good cause exception" did not apply); Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d
1117 (Cal. 2001) (finding that statements made in mediation are privileged); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Price, 78 P.3d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App 2003); State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Info.
Comm'n, 709 A.2d 1129 (Conn. 1998); see also Deason, supra note 148 (proposing more protection for
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viders of ADR are also rulemakers. Some pre-dispute contracts or the dispute
resolution systems they mandate may impose confidentiality. Further, some of
the large-scale, mass tort settlements create claimant payment systems that
include confidentiality requirements.150
These many privatizing modes put into a different context the oft-
invoked proposition that public access exists for all documents filed with the
court.151 Hold aside that, as a matter of law, some courts have distinguished
among the kinds of documents in courts' files, for example, by providing
access to discovery material annexed to substantive motions but ruling that
"material filed with discovery motions is not subject to the common-law right
of access." 152 Even if a rule prevailed that all court files were "accessible,"
public knowledge about a given dispute could still be constrained-depending
upon what information is filed with courts. The Federal Rules once required
that all discovery materials be filed unless a court ordered otherwise. 153 In
contrast, relatively recent amendments now provide the opposite: that "dis-
covery requests and responses must not be filed until they are used in the
confidentiality in mediation). A few examples of narrow construction of the privilege can be found. See, e.g.,
Ala. Dep't of Transp. v. Land Energy, Ltd., 886 So.2d 787, 805 (Ala. 2004).
150. For example, the Dalkon Shield litigation concluded with a trust authorized to make payments to
claimants. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (describing the trust's insistence on evaluating each case individually);
Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution,
31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 79 (1997). The trust did not provide public information about the amounts paid to
individuals; claimants represented by lawyers who appeared repeatedly may have gathered information
through informal networks. According to one of the trustees, the decision not to disclose was prompted by
the view that it helped to individualize each claimant's payment. See E-mail from Georgene Vairo, who had
served as a trustee and who is a Professor of Law at the Loyola School of Law, L.A., to the author (Oct. 22,
2004) (on file with the author).
151. FJC SEALED SETTLEMENTS STUDY, supra note 6, at 1.
As the Eleventh Circuit explained
[i]t is immaterial whether the sealing of the record is an integral part of a negotiated settle-
ment between the parties, even if the settlement comes with the court's active encouragement.
Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties' case,
but also the public's case. Absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.. . , the court file
must remain accessible to the public.
Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (1 th Cir. 1992); see also Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d
926 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring disclosure of a settlement because it had been filed with the court); Hermreiter
v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2002); Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1993);
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986).
152. See, e.g., Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
153. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d), which had provided that discovery materials were to be filed "within a
reasonable time." See 1938 RULES, supra note 117, 308 U.S. at 669. An accompanying note to amendments
in 1980, from the Advisory Committee, commented that, while cumbersome in size for courts to store,
such materials are sometimes of interest to those who may have no access to them except by a
requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public
generally. Accordingly, this amendment and a change in Rule 30(f)(1) continue the require-
ment of filing but make it subject to an order of the court that discovery materials not be filed
unless filing is requested by the court or is effected by parties who wish to use the materials in
the proceeding.
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proceeding or the court orders filing."' 54 Only if materials obtained through
discovery are reflected in or appended to motions or affidavits does that in-
formation make its way into the public realm.
Above, I suggested that the Federal Rules of 1938 incorporated a view of
procedure fairly described as a Due Process Model. One way to capture the
shift over the last three decades is to use the phrase Contract Procedure to
denote the degree to which rules, statutes, and practices have been reframed to
support conciliation in lieu of adjudication. At least thus far, such bargaining,
conducted at the prompting of courts, results in the privatization of process.
I should also note that settlement pressures are not confined to the trial
courts. Appellate courts have also changed their processes to aim for disposi-
tion through conciliation. Federal rules now permit appellate courts to "direct
the attorneys-and, when appropriate, the parties-to participate in one or
more conferences to address any matter that may aid in disposing of the pro-
ceedings, including simplifying the issues and discussing settlement."' 55
More than half of the federal circuits run such a "civil appeals management
program" (CAMP) and oblige attorneys for disputants to meet with a staff
member of the appellate court to negotiate settlements. 156 Further, in many
154. See FED. R. CrV. P. 5(d) (as amended in 2000).
155. See FED. R. APP. P. 33. The rule is described as "entirely rewritten" in the early 1990s by the
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1994 amendment.
156. See, e.g., lST CmR. R. 33 (b)(1) (discussing a pre-argument conference "to consider the possibility
of settlement" with a person designated by the court as a "Settlement Counsel"); 2D CIR. R. app.D (Guide-
lines for Conduct of Pre-Argument Conferences under the Civil Appeals Management Plan) (describing the
importance of an objective evaluation by Staff Counsel that considers "the possibility of settlement" as well
as the simplification of issues, and that in many instances the result is "settlement or withdrawal of some
appeals or particular issues"); U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, General Order Governing the
Appellate Conference Program, (Ivlar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
clerk/docs/order.pdf (describing referral of cases for conferences to explore settlement and that counsel are
required to participate in such scheduled conferences); 6TH CIR. R. 33(c)(1),(3) (requiring that all civil cases
be reviewed by a "mediation attorney" to decide whether a pre-argument conference would be useful and
permitting either a circuit judge or a staff attorney to serve as a "mediation attorney" to discuss settlement,
and noting that ifa judge serves, that judge may not sit on a panel but could participate in an en banc rehear-
ing); 8TH CIR. R. 33 (providing that civil appeals may be sent to a prehearing conference program to enable
discussions of a variety of matters, including settlement and authorizing either the program director or a
senior district judge to conduct such conferences); 9TH CIR. R. 33-1 (providing that the "primary purpose" of
such conferences is "to explore settlement," noting that either "the judge or court mediator" may require
parties to attend, and that parties can also submit issues "to an appellate commissioner for a binding determi-
nation"); FED. CiR. R. 33, available at http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/cafc2006.pdf (reiterating in part the provi-
sions of FED. R. APP. P. 33 and permitting the court to direct "attorneys-and when appropriate the parties-
to participate in one or more conferences to address any matter... including... settlement" that aids in the
disposition, permitting a judge or other person "designated by the court" to preside, and the court to issue
orders thereafter "controlling the course of the proceedings or implementing any settlement agreement").
Some proponents of the program report that many settlements are achieved as a result. See Mori Irvine, A
Look at Mediation, NAT'L L. J. ,Aug 27, 2001, at BI0 ("j[E]very circuit court of appeals except the Federal
Circuit has formally established a settlement program to help parties resolve their cases while pending
appeal.").
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circuits, oral arguments are held only with the permission of the court, and a
significant percentage of cases are decided "on the papers."'1 57
If cases do go to judgment, many appellate decisions are made summa-
rily, and even some of the written judgments are deemed unavailable for use
as precedent by other litigants.) 58 While new rules limit the ability of courts to
ban citation of "unpublished" decisions, 159 published opinions represent about
twenty percent of the dispositions of the federal appellate courts.160 (A market
response has been the creation of a new federal "reporter"-West's Federal
157. JUDITH A. MCKENNA, LAURA L. HOOPER & MARY CLARK, CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN
THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS I 1 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2000) 11 tbl.6 (providing data, as of FY 1998, that
the national average of cases decided after oral argument by appellate courts was 41 percent, over all). Of
cases in which litigants have counsel, the percentage of decisions after oral argument was 57 percent. Id.
158. The Honorable Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit helped to bring attention to this issue with
his opinion inAnastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000) (en banc).
159. In 2003, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure proposed a new
rule, 32.1, stating, "No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation of judicial opinions,
orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been designated 'unpublished,' 'not for publica-
tion,' 'non-precedential,' 'no precedent,' or the like, unless the restriction is generally imposed upon the
citation of all judicial opinions." See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Appellate Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 28-
29 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/appO803.pdf. (printing text of proposed rule).
That text was modified in April 2004. See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Proce-
dure at 42-43, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf ("A court may not prohibit
or restrict the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
designated 'unpublished,' 'not for publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'no precedent,' or the like.").
Responding to concerns raised by judges, additional data were collected. See REAGAN, CITING
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS, supra note 47. In 2005, the Standing Committee proposed
to the Judicial Conference that the new rule be promulgated, with clarifications that a court not "prohibit or
restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions" to ensure that the rule not be read to apply to state decisions.
DAVID F. LEVI, STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES app. A-2 (2005), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf. On September 20, 2005, the Judicial Conference
approved the rule, with the addition that it not apply to opinions issued before January 1 of 2007, and for-
warded that rule, along with others, to the Supreme Court. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 20, 2005, at 36-37, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/sept05procjfinal.pdf; see also Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito,
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure 2 (May 9, 2005, Revised Oct. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP10-2005.pdf (reflecting the change). The Court, in turn, promul-
gated the rule along with other changes, in the spring of 2006 and that set of rules will govern, absent con-
gressional action, in December 2006. See Supreme Court Action: Rules and Amendments Approved
4/12/06, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules.
160. See 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 87, at 39, tbl.S-3, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/tables/s3.pdf. As to state decisions, see Arthur G. Scotland, The Filing
and Publication of Appellate Opinions: A Survey of the Council of Chief Judges of Courts of Appeal,
JUDGES' J., Winter 2004, at 31.
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Appendix-begun in 2001 and devoted to "unpublished" decisions.161) If
neither an argument takes place nor a decision is published, or if a decision
consists of a notation that a court has summarily affirmed or reversed a judg-
ment, the public has no window into appellate court processes.
V. CHOOSING RULES
Given the political import and social utilities of open adjudicatory proc-
esses and the host of new techniques from pre-filing preclusion of litigation to
post-filing confidentiality that limit public access to dispute resolution proc-
esses and outcomes, new lawmaking is needed. Below, I sketch some inter-
ventions that would help courts both to serve as information-producers and to
enact political and social commitments about the necessarily-participatory
processes of the creation and enforcement of legal norms.
One area to revisit is the common law and entrepreneurial commitment
to party autonomy in adjudication. A laissez-faire system once permitted dis-
putants the freedom to shape the presentation of disputes (subject to pleading,
joinder, and evidentiary rules). Today's rules now oblige disputants to bargain
but a good deal of case law assumes that settlement contracts should be
treated like other contracts. Even when facing post-settlement objections,
many judges ignore the court pressures, ex ante, to bargain. Judges often act
as if negotiations suffice to validate whatever deals litigants' lawyers produce.
For example, while some state procedural rules specify that a binding settle-
ment requires a signed writing or an agreement made in open court, 162 the
federal courts do not currently have an equivalent national rule. 163 Rather,
federal courts generally presume that lawyers' representations of agreements
made suffice to bind their clients. Further, eager to create incentives for set-
tlement, some judges have encouraged privacy. In the words of one Second
161. These volumes include opinions issued by the federal appellate courts but "not selected for publi-
cation in the Federal Reporter." See West-Federal Appendix, http://West.thomspon.com/
product/40015694/product.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
162. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 807.05 (2004); NEB. COUNTY CT. GEN. R. 4; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104 (McKin-
ney 2004 & Supp. 2006); WA. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 2A.
163. Some federal courts have enforced some oral agreements despite the absence of a written agree-
ment. Further, some enforcement rulings rely on information from trial judges who add their own language
to or recollections about the bargains made. See, e.g., Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., 73 F.3d 1276, 1283 (2d
Cir. 1996) (noting that the parties' agreement had not been reduced to writing nor signed in open court but
that the reasonable reliance upon it made its enforcement appropriate); Brockman v. Sweetwater County
Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 93-8052, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10095, at *2-4, *7-9 (10th Cir. May 5, 1994) (de-
noted "not binding precedent") (affirming a district court's order holding enforceable a settlement of an
employment discrimination claim-despite the plaintiff's claim that no final agreement on all the terms had
been reached-when the agreement came from an oral agreement between a teacher and a school district,
supported by a transcript of a discussion of its drafting with a magistrate judge); Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F.
Supp. 2d 63, 69-70 (D. Mass. 1999) (detailing the course of an alleged repudiation of a settlement and the
lack of agreement).
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Circuit panel, "honoring the parties' express wish for confidentiality may
facilitate settlement." 164 By permitting parties to a litigation to buy and sell
access of third parties to the information generated through the initial dispute,
courts create additional markets and affect the prices of settlements.
In contrast, a few extant statutes, rules, and doctrines do impose con-
straints on bargaining by conditioning court approval of case dispositions on
standards imposed by law. The interventions are sometimes predicated on
anxiety that litigants did not voluntarily and knowledgeably give up the op-
portunity to pursue public adjudication. Other rules focus on evaluating the
quality of the bargain made, while yet others require information about the
underlying dispute or the terms of the agreement. Based either on the kind of
claim, the nature of the party, or the scale of the case, current law oversees
categories of settlements. And, episodically, a particular kind of term in a
specific settlement has troubled judges, when they are asked by litigants either
for approval or enforcement.
Specifically, a few statutes and some court-based rules mandate that set-
tlements can only be entered if the terms are revealed to and the fact of
agreement approved by the court. Examples include class actions, 165 cases
filed under the Tunney Act, 166 under the Fair Labor Standards Act,167 and
criminal prosecutions. 168 Judges have, through caselaw or rules, sometimes
refused to enforce agreements to vacate otherwise valid lower court deci-
164. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that when
settlements were conditioned on confidentiality and did not include information on amounts paid, no disclo-
sure was required). Gambale also concluded that despite the dismissal of the action, federal courts retained
jurisdiction to deal with materials in their files. Id. at 141; see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d
772 (3d Cir. 1994) (remanding for the district court to consider the utility of confidentiality).
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e),(g)-(h).
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (2000).
167. See, e.g., Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11 th Cir. 1982) (describ-
ing the court's obligation to ensure that litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. be settled in a manner that is
"fair and reasonable"); Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (E.D. Va. 1999) (discussing this
common law requirement). In Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2003), Judge
Myron Thompson both explained the rationale for judicial oversight and ordered the unsealing of a settle-
ment between an employee and an employer.
168. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 (requiring that plea proceedings be conducted in "open court" and detail-
ing the questions that must be addressed). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (Supp. I1 2005) (requiring that
judges state "in open court" their reasons for imposing sentences); United States v. Alcantara, 396 F. 3d 189,
191-92 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing the right of access to plea and sentencing hearings, admonishing judges
not to conduct sentencing hearings in their robing rooms absent adherence to procedures, including advanced
notice and opportunities for a hearing, and commenting that the "power to close a courtroom" in a criminal
proceeding ought to be exercised only under "urgent circumstances" and with "very clear and apparent
reasons" (citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 575-76 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding, in
light of security concerns, the imposition of photo identification requirements as a predicate to courtroom




sions 169 or required that proponents of class action settlements disclose side-
settlements. 170 Some jurists have also objected to provisions, such as "most
favored nation clauses" promising to reopen settlements if other agreements
are made on more favorable terms, 171 or have refused to enforce confidential-
ity agreements in various circumstances. 172 Judges have also declined to in-
terpret parties' agreements to preclude other litigants from access to expert
information, 173 have selectively reviewed court materials and exhibits to de-
termine whether portions involving children's emotional and medical condi-
tions might be sealed while leaving access open to other parts of a record, 174
and have endeavored to require honesty in negotiations through post-
settlement enforcement of only those agreements predicated on good faith
disclosure of relevant facts.175
Law could do more. One example comes from a Supreme Court deci-
sion-Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America176
-
addressing the availability of federal jurisdiction to enforce settlements. The
Court suggested that in diversity cases, one method to make federal courts
available for post-settlement litigation aimed at enforcing settlements would
be to incorporate settlement terms into notices of dismissal or into consent
judgments.177 For those litigants in search of continuing federal jurisdiction,
the Kokkonen decision creates incentives to file agreements with courts-
169. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994); see generally
Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role ofAdjudica-
tion at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994).
170. The authority to request such information is suggested in the Advisory Committee's notes to the
2003 revisions of the class action rule. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2) & Advisory Committee's Notes (requir-
ing that parties seeking approval of class action settlements inform the court of "any agreement made in
connection with the proposed settlement").
171. See Kathryn E. Spier, "Tied to the Mast": Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts,
32 J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (2003). Those clauses require that, ifa settlement is made with other parties on terms
more favorable than that entered by the contracting parties, the earlier settlement would be enhanced to
equalize it to the later settlement.
172. See, e.g., Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (permitting
one employee, alleging sexual harassment by an employer, access to a settlement agreement between that
employer and another employee that those parties had deemed confidential). The court provided limited
access, accompanied by a protective order, authorizing only the plaintiff, her lawyers, and her experts access
to information about the prior settlement. Id. at 739.
173. See Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
174. Jaufre ex rel. Jaufre v. Taylor, 351 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. La. 2005).
175. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866 (1994) (quoting Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 13a, Digital Equip., 511 U.S. 863 (No. 93-205)). According to the brief submitted by Desktop
Direct, Digital's chief executive officer had led Desktop's chief executive officer to believe that the alleged
infringement was an "innocent mistake" but that subsequently information surfaced that the case for "willful
infringement" was strong. See Brief of Respondent at *3, Digital Equip., 511 U.S. 863 (No. 93-205), 1994
WL 249425.
176. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
177. Id. at 381. For analysis of the decision, see Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 9, at 633-
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which would (under current law) make those documents accessible to others.
But the Court's opinion used tentative phrases, perhaps suggesting that the
Justices hoped for guidance from other sources or did not agree on a broader
ruling. The legal question of using settlements to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts is significant, as are the issues of whether judges have the in-
herent power to impose disclosure or other conditions on settlements in all
cases, and/or whether the Federal Rules that address settlement give judges
license to do so. 178
The importance and complexity of these issues is why court-based rules
need not and should not be the only source of regulation. Aspects of these
topics are now subject to state regulations, as statutes in some jurisdictions
override litigants' agreements. Sometimes, the predicate is state oversight of
professionals and of insurance, and sometimes the result is an affirmative
obligation, imposed on certain professions or institutions, to make public the
settlements achieved. Examples include cases involving medical malpractice
and health care professionals, with regulations keyed to agreements for more
than a stated amount. 179
Legislation is also propelled by concerns that institutional actors know of
injurious products but have the power, through bargaining, to keep informa-
tion private. 180 For example, in 1990, Florida enacted what it entitled the Sun-
shine in Litigation Act, prohibiting courts from entering an order
178. To the extent that judicial authority over settlements is understood to be an aspect of the equitable
powers, Justice Scalia has twice written for the majority that the judicial role is limited, absent congressional
authorization, to that exercised by the judiciary at the time of the founding. See Grupo Mexicano de Desar-
rollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,
and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223,231-70 (2003).
179. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-17a (2003) (requiring that, "[ulpon entry of any medical mal-
practice award or upon entering a settlement of a malpractice claim" against those licensed under other
provisions, the entity making payment or the party are to notify the Department of Public Health of "the
terms of the award or settlement" as well as to provide a copy along with the complaint and answer); New
Jersey Health Care Consumer Information Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.21-:9-22.25 (West 2004) (en-
acted in June of 2003 and requiring that all "medical malpractice court judgments and all medical malprac-
tice arbitration awards" in which a complaining party had received an award within the five most recent
years be made available to the public in profiles of physicians and podiatrists licensed to practice in the state
of New Jersey). In May of 2004, a few weeks before the Act was to become effective, the Medical Society of
New Jersey sued the state's Consumer Division to enjoin implementation of the Act, argued to be in conflict
with federal rights of expectations of privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 11137 and the Constitution. See Malpractice
Data Blocked, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 2004, at B4. Those efforts were refused in Medical Society of New
Jersey v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D.N.J. 2004).
180. California legislators have considered but (as of the fall of 2005) not enacted a provision focused
on these issues. See An Act to Add Section 188 to the Code of Civil Procedure, Relating to Secrecy Agree-
ments, AB 1700, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess (as amended June 1, 2005), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_1651-1700/ab 1700 bill 20050601_amended-asm.pdf (propos-
ing to require court review of all "[s]ecrecy agreements and protective orders" because of the "tragic conse-
quences" of some secrecy, such as injuries from "dangerous defects in Firestone tires, which have reportedly
caused more than 150 deaths and more than 500 injuries worldwide," kept from the "public eye by secretly
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which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any in-
formation concerning a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order
or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing any informa-
tion which may be useful to members of the public in protecting them-
selves from injury which may result from the public hazard.
18 1
In 1999, Florida also required that its Department of Public Health pub-
lish on the Internet payment of malpractice claims in excess of a specified
amount. 182 At least twenty other states have statutes or court rules constrain-
ing in various ways the ability to make unavailable court documents and out-
comes. 183
Parallel federal legislation (also called a Sunshine in Litigation Act) has
been proposed but not enacted. 184 One district court-the District of South
Carolina-filled a part of the gap by prohibiting the sealing of settlements
filed in court and, by doing so, became the focus of a good deal of commen-
tary.18 5 Other federal district court local rules also address these issues from a
range of perspectives. Some restrain the length of time in which documents
can be sealed, 186 while others note the availability (with and without court
supervision) of agreements to keep information confidential and to "return or
destroy" discovery documents. 187 Yet another potential source of regulation
settling many lawsuits brought as a result of crashes related to defective tires"). The provision would permit
secrecy only upon a judicial finding and only if narrowly tailored and would not affect the "ability of the
parties to enter into a settlement agreement... that requires the nondisclosure of the amount of any money
paid in a settlement of a claim." Id. at § 2(0.
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004).
182. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.041(4) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring reporting of payments of claims
that exceed $100,000).
183. Included on that list are Arkansas, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington. Coverage and exceptions vary widely. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-55-122, 25-18-401 (West 2004) (prohibiting the sealing of government documents
and voiding private contracts that limit disclosure of environmental hazards); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-
1.3 (West 2000) (prohibiting sealing of settlements of "any suit, administrative proceeding or arbitration
instituted against any agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions" arising out of government
actions except those related to medical care, unless the policy of openness is overridden and no other less
restrictive means is available); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.71.350 (West. 1999) (requiring professional
liability insurers of physicians to report settlements in excess of $20,000 or the payment of three or more
claims within a five-year period); id. at § 4.24.611 (West 2005) (limiting confidentiality provisions when
claims involve product liability or hazardous substances). See also Goldstein, supra note 45.
184. See supra note 5.
185. See D.S.C. Civ. R. 5.03(E) (providing that "[n]o settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be
sealed pursuant to the terms of this Rule"). In addition, any party seeking to "file documents under seal"
must file a motion to do so, specify the documents sought to be sealed, explain the necessity for sealing, and
whether "less drastic alternatives" would not "afford adequate protection." Id. at 5.03(A). See generally
Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv 711 (2004).
186. See, e.g., E.D. MICH. Civ. R. 5.4 (limiting the duration of sealing to a presumptive two years);
W.D. MICH Cry. R. 10.6(c) (limiting sealing, absent court order, to thirty days after the termination of a
case).
187. See D.N.J. Civ. R. 5.3(b)(l)-(5) (seeming to permit such agreements without court permission but
also providing for filing explanations of the reasons).
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are ethical rules or statutes that address the professional propriety of lawyers
restricting public access to information that might pose "substantial danger to
the public health or safety."' 188
As the various "Sunshine" acts suggest, legislators or judges could put
the possibility of confidentiality "off the table"--as an item that cannot be
bought and sold when lawsuits are concluded in courts. A justification for
reducing litigant freedom is that the bargaining pressures come in part from
legal efforts to promote conciliation over adjudication. The connection be-
tween the disputing but contracting parties does not stem from friendly shared
ventures that result in spontaneous "meetings of the minds." Rather, an un-
happy participant in a conflict brought claims of right to the public that, acting
through its judges, urged the parties to conciliate. As these problems are pro-
foundly ones of social policy, legislative engagement is needed to regulate the
power of parties and judges either to enable information generation through
courts or to inhibit that potential.
VI. INSTRUCTIONS FROM HISTORY AND FOR POSTERITY
A summary is in order as a predicate to concluding. As adjudication de-
veloped over the centuries, its method was to proceed in public view. The
public dimensions were both an effort to legitimate the authority of govern-
ment and an effort to demonstrate that government had authority. The concept
of judicial independence was not yet deeply entrenched; 189 rather, judges
were often conceived as appropriately dependent on rulers and obliged to
work as loyal servants and faithful enforcers of a ruling regime's laws. Gov-
erning powers used public processes as a technique to police judges by watch-
ing to see that their loyalty to the state was on display. In short, the public
practices of adjudicatory processes were not initially developed as cheery
aspects of democratic polities, committed to transparency in government, but
as the means by which to perform the state's power to do violence in its own
(the law's) name.
But inside adjudication's practices were ideas that helped to shape de-
mocratic ideas about government. Not only was obedience to the law of the
state required but through its performance of its powers, the state also came to
try to demonstrate that its actions were legitimate rather than wholly arbitrary.
188. See, e.g., Written Testimony from Richard A. Zitrin to the Ethics 2000 Comm'n of the Am. Bar
Ass'n Ctr. for Professional Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2kmonthear.html (May 29, 1998)
(proposing this amendment to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2(B) but the change was not enacted).
189. But even in earlier eras, the idea of a jurist "speaking truth to power" came to be an understood as
an important aspect of the judicial role. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction,
14 CAP. U. L. REv. 179 (1985).
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(Even so-called "show trials" of fascistic regimes can entail a justificatory
effort to demonstrate the propriety of action by seeking to claim that outcomes
are based in fact and law application.) Further, inside adjudication can be
found the idea of equality between and fairness to disputants, such that they
should be provided with hearings, with even-handed treatment, and be given a
decision uncorrupted by special access or gifts given to jurists.
The rise of democracy altered the kinds of persons eligible to participate
as witnesses, as litigants, and as judges, as well as the obligations of the state.
Women and men of all colors gained juridical voice as the state came to be
seen as obliged to account for its behavior and to provide remedies for
wrongdoing. Over time, the concept of separation of powers took hold as
well, resulting in an insistence that judges be free from reprisals by the state
when they entered judgment in individual cases, even though those judges
owed their salaries and commissions to the state.
During the twentieth century, adjudication came to be understood as a
signature of functioning democracies and of market economies.190 In the
United States, the expansion in the early part of the twentieth century of reli-
ance on the Due Process Model of Civil Procedure rested on a normative
framework that welcomed national regulation and rights-seeking. Predicated
on public and disciplined factfmding by judges and juries, adjudication li-
censed decisionmakers to inquire into specific problems to assess individual
instances as well as collective problems stemming from alleged wrongdoing
in order to enforce obligations both public and private. 191 The process located
judges, litigants, and witnesses in particularly confining roles. As Lon Fuller
famously explained, the presentation of proofs by litigants and the determina-
tion based on reasons by judges are the "distinguishing" characteristics of
adjudication, which puts individuals working inside its strictures to "a peculiar
form of participation."' 19
2
The premises supporting this commitment to adjudication were both
normative and political: that the state is appropriately a central regulator of
conduct, that norm enforcement through transparent decisionmaking by state-
empowered judges is desirable, that public resources ought to be spent upon
individual complaints of alleged failures to comply with legal obligations, that
litigants ought equally to be provided with opportunities to present proofs and
190. See generally DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF
COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Sift Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin Skaar eds., 2004); THE SELF-
RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Andreas Schedler, Larry
Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999).
191. See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 62, at 1024-31; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of
Justice, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-17 (1979).
192. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978).
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reasoned arguments, that the power of adjudicators can be controlled by
obliging them to rely on facts adduced on the record and to perform some of
their duties in public, and that legitimate judgments thus result. While ad hoc
juries have little by way of obligations of explanation, full-time judges are
supposed to provide rationales for their application of law to fact, and those
decisions are in turn subjected to appellate review at the parties' behest. Direct
participants and third parties benefit through the visible display of law's re-
quirements applied to a myriad of specific situations. Further, through public
access, both lay and legal participants became socialized to the idea that dis-
agreement about the shape of norms was an ordinary facet of a well-
functioning democratic order.
As I hope this discussion has made plain, public access to and informa-
tion about dispute resolution have historically been achieved through locating
those processes inside courthouses. Only a subset of people fell within the
then-much smaller group of rights-holding litigants, able to bring claims into
those halls. When they did, and until the invention in the 1930s of important
pretrial processes, judges formally encountered lawyers in open courtrooms,
where nonparties could watch the proceedings.
The great broadening of rights of access to courts, both in terms of per-
sons eligible to make claims and of claims now able to be made, was accom-
panied by a proliferation of sites of adjudication. Now able to contemplate
that overflow, one can also find that the myriad of techniques to cope (crafted
from a mixture of concerns) are not all equally facilitating of public knowl-
edge about and public participation in rights elaboration and enforcement. As
long as courts continue to be places that produce public data in volume and
kind outstripping that produced about adjudication in administrative agencies,
and as long as private providers do not regularly disseminate information
about or provide access to their processes, then the declining trial rate, devolu-
tion, outsourcing, and internal rule changes pressing conciliation brings a
diminution of public knowledge of disputes, of the behavior of judges, and of
the forging, in public, of normative responses to discord.
Some would argue that more is gained than is lost, that the widening
reach of adjudication imposed grave costs on efficiency, discretion, and inter-
personal flourishing. The shift in the last three decades to Contract Procedure
is nested in social and political attitudes less hospitable to government over-
sight in general and more welcoming of private development of norms and of
market-based enforcement mechanisms. Unlike adjudication's preference for
adjudicators' pronouncements, ADR looks to the participants to validate out-
comes through consensual agreements, sometimes fashioned by bilateral ne-
gotiation and sometimes facilitated through third parties. As detailed by the
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description of new rules of courts and of legislatures, these attitudes are now
held by many, judges included. As one circuit court recently explained, the
current job of a federal district court judge is to "encourage settlements and to
poke and prod reluctant parties to compromise, especially when their differ-
ences are not great and/or their claims or defenses are not airtight."'193
Deliberately, ADR has far fewer role constraints. Its techniques do not
commonly build in requirements of public explanation of the results obtained,
do not insist that such outcomes be justified in relationship to legal norms, nor
put activities of decisionmaking before the public. ADR practitioners are en-
couraged to "get it done" rather than obliged to explain how they "got it
right."' 194 Indeed, ADR is often chosen because it has the advantage of private
decisionmaking, made in the "shadow" rather than in the light. Public benefits
are presumed to flow from the reduction of conflict and the resolutions predi-
cated on parties' preferences.
My hope for this essay is that, while disagreement about adjudication's
utility can be had, one ought not to assume the endurance of the ability to
equate courts with public access. Procedures, laws, and norms have great
plasticity. Practices that seemed unimaginable only decades ago (from the
mundane example that ruledrafters assumed aggregation through class actions
was ill-suited for mass torts195 to the horrific events of 9/11 and the detentions
at Guantanamo) are now parts of our collective landscape. Seeing the possi-
bility for change as an opportunity, and appreciating the volume of filings and
the political reticence to commit the resources requisite to supporting robust
public institutions of dispute resolution that welcome all of those now entitled
to make claims, we need to consider how to reformat the multiple sites of
adjudication. One ought not to equate administrative agencies and private
providers inevitably with secrecy. Rather, choices abound about how to struc-
ture all these processes, as one can build in or discourage public dimensions.
The "answers" to the normative questions entailed cannot come through
a retreat to doctrine or rules or analogies to past practices. At issue are
whether a role ought to be preserved for public participation in dispute resolu-
tion in either courts or their alternatives and how public resources will be
distributed to support either sector. As the variety of rules and customs sur-
rounding court-annexed arbitration suggest, even as judges and other dispute
resolution providers move away from trials and focus on pretrial management
193. Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994,995 (7th Cir. 2001).
194. See Amy Schulman, Sidebar, Change of Venue, in THE FUTURE OF LITIGATION: SPECIAL REPORT,
A SUPPLEMENT TO THE AMERJCAN LAWYER AND CORPORATE COUNSEL 26 (Fall 2003).
195. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) & Advisory Committee's Notes (1966) (providing that a "'mass acci-
dent' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action"), and discus-
sion in Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, " LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, Summer 1991, at 5.
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and dispute resolution in chambers and conference rooms, it is possible to
build in a place for the public or to wall off proceedingsfrom the public. But
to do so requires direction from judges and rules of court or from legislatures.
Recent statutory innovations suggest some of the options. For example, a
small exception to the privatizing aspects of the Federal Arbitration Act came
into being in 2002 for automobile dealerships who have conflicts with manu-
facturers. Car dealerships now have the option to insist on going to court.
Further, if arbitration is used, the arbitrator must provide reasons for the deci-
sion and make them available to the public. 196 Pending, as of this writing, is a
parallel proposal for an exception to the FAA for chicken farmers. 197
In sum, to conceive of the issue as adjudication versus ADR (in courts,
through agencies, or by private providers) is to miss that privatization is oc-
curring on both sides of that equation. To ensure public access requires af-
firmative action. This Symposium can help to shape a debate about access to
court-based ADR, to court-enforced ADR, and to information about settle-
ments.
Moreover, federal judges, functioning as an interest group in this debate,
may now be under new pressures that could prompt a reconsideration of the
general enthusiasm for managerial judging and settlement. As adjudication is
eclipsed by the very alternatives that federal judges have promoted and some-
times mandated, the bases for enthusiastic and plentiful support for the federal
courts diminishes. As judges lose their unique functions and as trials "vanish,"
justifications emerge (in a culture none too friendly toward government and
already well-schooled in how to be aggressive towards judges) for cutting
back on budget allocations. Such concerns can be found (implicitly) within
the pages of the reports of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, which have begun to explain that, despite the absence of trials, judges
need courtrooms in which to do their work, and moreover, that federal judges
remain very busy.198
196. See Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226
and commonly referred to as the "Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001"). A
recent comment on this provision argued that it was both the first to create an exemption from the FAA and
benefitted "relatively sophisticated business interests rather than individual consumers or employees who
have also sought exemptions." See Carl J. Chiappa & David Stoelting, Tip of the Iceberg? New Law Exempts
Car Deals from Federal Arbitration Act, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 219 (2003). The effects of this act have been the
subject of some litigation addressing what contracts are affected by it. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Vans LLC.
v. Freightliner of N.H. Inc., Civ, No. 03-304-B, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 316 (D.N.H. Jan. 8, 2004) ("not for
publication"); Pride v. Ford Motor Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d. 617 (N.D. Miss. 2004). See generally Paul D.
Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The "National Policy" of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259 (2003).
197. See Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2003, S. 91, 108th Cong. (2003); 149 CONG. REC. S75
(daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
198. See, e.g., 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 87, at 21-22 (discussing that the level of trials had
remained "essentially steady at 12,938 (down 10 trials from 2003)" but that "[i]n addition to conducting
trials, judges perform many other case-related functions"). The text of the discussion about the "many other
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A review of the history of adjudication makes plain that courts are al-
ways being reinvented. In the twenty-first century, courts could be refash-
ioned as institutions of settlement but nonetheless be required to enable forms
of public access and participation. Options range from letting outsiders ob-
serve ADR'DR to mandating forms of databasing that would permit either
individual or aggregate knowledge about processes and outcomes in public
and in private settings. As to the source of rules-legislative, court-made, or
developed through doctrine-judges today are occupying the default position
as long as statutes and rules are silent. I.
To shape practices to enhance public access requires a normative re-
commitment to the importance of the public dimensions of dispute resolution,
coupled with the development of institutional infrastructures equipped and
funded to produce and to gather the data and ideas about how to license and to
protect information. Some of the proponents of privatization assume its stra-
tegic utility. In the long run, however, that approach may prove less desirable.
Governments need courts, and people need governments. The public pag-
eantry of rights, obligations, and redress underscores the interdependencies
requisite for the various sectors within a democratic order to flourish. History
cannot tell us how to answer the many questions about how to provide public
dispute resolution for the volume of claimants so seeking it, but history can
provide evidence of the many utilities and political commitments-for the
already powerful as well as for those in hopes of obtaining power-of the
public processes of adjudication.
case-related functions" parallels that of the reports from earlier years. See Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and
Vanishing, supra note 49, at 833-34.
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